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Split Derivatives: Inside the World's Most
Misunderstood Contract
Dan Awreyt
Derivatives are the "bad boys" of modern finance: exciting, dangerous,
and fundamentally misunderstood. These misunderstandings stem from the
failure of scholars and policymakers to fully appreciate the unique legal and
economic structure of derivative contracts, along with the important differences
between these contracts and conventional equity and debt securities. This Article
seeks to correct these misunderstandings by splitting derivative contracts open,
identifying their constituent elements, and observing how these elements interact
with one another. These elements include some ofthe world's most sophisticated
state-contingent contracting, the allocation of property and decision-making
rights, and relational mechanisms such as reputation and the expectation of
future dealings. The resulting hybridity essentially splits every derivative into
two separate contracts: one that governs under normal market conditions, and
another that governs under conditions of fundamental uncertainty. In good
times, derivative contracts contemplate the almost automatic determination and
performance of each counterparty's obligations. In bad times, these contracts
include various mechanisms designed to provide counterparties with the
flexibility to incorporate new information, fill contractual gaps, and promote
efficient renegotiation.
The process of splitting derivative contracts open yields a number of
important policy insights. First, the bundling of contract, property, decision-
making rights, and relational mechanisms makes derivatives look far more like
commercial loans than publicly traded shares or bonds. The regulatory
treatment of derivatives as "securities" and the resulting emphasis on market
transparency is thus somewhat misguided and serves to distract attention from
the significant prudential risks posed by the widespread use of derivatives.
Second, the flexibility associated with the relational mechanisms embedded
within many derivative contracts can play a useful role in promoting both
institutional and broaderfinancial stability. This has important implications in
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terms of the desirability of the recent push toward mandatory central clearing of
derivative contracts. It also exposes the potential perils of recent proposals to
use distributed ledger technology and smart contracts to execute, clear, and
settle these contracts. By the same token, the widespread breakdown of these
relational mechanisms can be a source offinancial instability. This provides a
compelling rationale for authorizing central banks to act as "dealers of last
resort" during periods offundamental uncertainty.
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Introduction
Derivatives are the "bad boys" of modern finance: exciting, dangerous, and
fundamentally misunderstood. Their supporters have defended them as
important instruments for measuring, managing, and transferring risk, thereby
enhancing both the efficiency and resilience of the financial system.2 Their
1. As described in greater detail in Part I, the focus of this Article is on what would have
historically been referred to as "over-the-counter" (OTC) derivatives, including swaps, forwards, and
credit default swaps, as distinct from exchange-traded options or futures.
2. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago's Forty-First Annual Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May
5, 2005), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505 [https://perma.cc/B2CQ-
SDAQ].
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critics have labeled them everything from "socially useless,"3 to "financial
weapons of mass destruction," to "the crystal meth of finance."5 They have been
singled out by policymakers as one of the principal catalysts of the global
financial crisis of 2007-2009.6 They have even been condemned by His Holiness
the Pope.7 Indeed, in the wake of the financial crisis, it often seems like everyone
who is anyone has an opinion about derivatives.
The recent controversy surrounding derivatives has coincided with the
introduction of a number of fundamental reforms to the way we regulate them.
The most important of these reforms include new trade reporting requirements,
mandatory central clearing for many standardized derivatives, and higher capital
and margin requirements for those derivatives not subject to central clearing.
These reforms reflect a growing consensus around the need for greater
transparency and more effective oversight of the $600 trillion global derivatives
market. 9
Perhaps not surprisingly, the controversy surrounding derivatives has also
spawned a large and growing academic literature. Important strands of this
literature examine the impact of equity and credit derivatives on corporate
governance,'0 the special treatment of derivatives under corporate bankruptcy
3. Adair Turner, How to Tame Global Finance, PROSPECT MAG. (Aug. 26, 2009),
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/how-to-tame-global-finance [https://perma.cc/XQ97-
YTGW] (referring to complex financial instruments such as credit default swaps).
4. Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 2002 Annual Report, BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY 15 (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ZXK-L358].
5. Thomas A. Bass, Derivatives: The Crystal Meth ofFinance, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun.
5, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-a-bass/derivatives-the-crystal-
m_b_195221.html [https://perma.cc/HCP9-GS2K]. The fact that critics seem to be able to turn a more
elegant phrase perhaps helps explain the public's often negative perception of derivatives.
6. An overview of the subsequent policy response can be found in Section IC.
7. See, e.g., Joe Rennison, Pope Says Credit Default Swaps Are Unethical, FIN. TIMES
(May 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/645ablf0-59fb-11 e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0
[https://perma.cc/7PAF-VG5M] (reporting on the Pope's condemnation of credit default swaps).
8. The trade reporting requirements are described in greater detail in Section IVA. The
(regulatory) shift toward mandatory central clearing is described in Sections II.C and IV.B.
9. See Global OTC Derivatives Market, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (BIS),
https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK6Y-QS4G]; Global OTC Derivatives Market
(Continued), BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JQ4-Q23U].
10. See, e.g., Jordan Barry, John Hatfield & Scott Kominers, On Derivatives Markets
and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103 (2013);
Bernard Black & Henry Hu, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Ronald Masulis & Randall Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219 (2009);
Frank Partnoy & David Skeel, The Promise and Peril of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019;
(2007); Rene M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73. (2010).
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law," the economics of bilateral versus central clearing of derivative contracts, 2
and the risks stemming from the opaque dealer-intermediated structure of
derivatives markets.1 3 There are also significant bodies of scholarship examining
both the historical regulatory treatment of derivatives' 4 and the fundamental
reforms to the regulation of derivatives markets introduced in response to the
financial crisis.'
Despite this groundswell in academic interest, scholars have thus far paid
remarkably little attention to the actual contracts at the heart of derivatives
markets.1 6 Policymakers, meanwhile, often seem to be more interested in costly
turf wars than understanding precisely what it is they are fighting to regulate. 7
Yet understanding what these contracts say, how they work, and how contracting
parties seek to address their inevitable limitations is extremely important:
especially given the fundamental differences between these contracts and the
publicly-traded shares, bonds, options, and futures that dominate academic and
policy debates in the fields of corporate governance, securities law, and financial
11. See, e.g., Franklin Edwards & Edward Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2005); Stephen Lubben, Derivatives and
Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009); Partnoy & Skeel,
supra note 10; Mark Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator,
63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011).
12. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Theo Ludke, Policy Perspectives on OTC
Derivatives Markets Infrastructure, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 424 (2010); Darrell
Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Credit Risk?, 1
REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74 (2011); Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REG. 44 (2009); see
also Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387
(2013).
13. See, e.g., Viral Acharya & Timothy Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives,
84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007); Dan Awrey, The Mechanisms ofDerivatives Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1104 (2016); Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L.J. 381 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 421 (2001); Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics ofDerivative Securities
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997); Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999).
15. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 59-75 (2011); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation,
and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 235 (2012); Sean Griffith,
Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY
L.J. 1153 (2012); Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2013); Lynn
Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2011).
16. The most notable exception being several textbooks, the majority of which are
published in the United Kingdom, that describe derivatives contracts, jurisprudence, and policy. See, e.g.,
SIMON FIRTH, DERIVATIVES: LAW AND PRACTICE (2015); ALISTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES (5th ed. 2012). There is also an important, if relatively small, literature in the fields of
anthropology and sociology that examines the operation of derivatives markets. See, e.g., ANNELISE
RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE (2011); Bruce Carruthers, Diverging Derivatives: Law, Governance
and Modern Financial Markets, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 386 (2013).
17. See Partnoy, supra note 14; Romano, supra note 14; Stout, supra note 14 (each
describing the regulatory turf wars between the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. and the Federal Reserve over the regulation of derivatives).
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regulation." In order to fully understand these differences, we need to split
derivatives open, identify their constituent elements, and observe how these
elements interact with one another.
As we shall see, the process of splitting derivatives open exposes a far
richer and more complex universe of elements than conventional academic and
policy debates would otherwise have us believe (see Figure 1). The first element
is some of the world's most sophisticated state-contingent contracting. These
state-contingent contract terms govern each party's payment and delivery
obligations, the circumstances in which they will be required to post collateral
against potential future losses, and the consequences of counterparty default. 9
Under normal market conditions-in good times-the execution of these terms
relies on input variables that are easily and objectively observable.20 These
variables include the price of the underlying asset, the value of posted collateral,
and the credit ratings of the counterparties.2 In good times, the determination
and performance of each counterparty's obligations under a derivative contract
may thus appear highly mechanical-almost automatic.
Figure 1: The Elements of a Derivative Contract
1 2
C P
Contract Property
3 4
D R
Decision Ri hts Relationshps
18. As I have described elsewhere, these differences reflect the executory nature of
derivative contracts, the dealer-intermediated structure of the markets in which they trade, and the role of
dealers as the primary sources of market liquidity. See Awrey, supra note 13, at 1124-38.
19. These state-contingent terms are described in greater detail in Part I and Section
II.A.
20. For a more detailed description of these "good times" and how they differ from
"bad" times, see Appendix A. Of course, one might ask whether normal market conditions are, in fact,
"normal" in the sense of prevailing the majority of the time. This Article brackets this question, using the
term "normal market conditions" to refer to those conditions that qualify as "good times" as described in
Appendix A.
21. This is not to say that these input variables are accurate, only that they are
observable.
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How derivatives work in good times is the product of three intertwined
trends.22 The first is the ongoing standardization of derivative contracts under
the auspices of organizations such as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). The second made possible by the first-is an increasing
level of automation in connection with the execution, clearing, and settlement of
derivative contracts. The third is the shift toward central clearing of standardized
derivative contracts as mandated under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act. 3 Together, these trends have contributed to the
appearance that derivative contracts are becoming more commoditized, more
transparent, and more liquid in short, more like publicly-traded shares, bonds,
options, and futures.
But appearances can be deceiving. For all their sophistication, the detailed
state-contingent terms at the heart of derivative contracts are inevitably
incomplete. 24 This incompleteness reflects the high front-end costs of writing
contracts that identify the entire universe of possible future states of the world
and then clearly specifying the rights and obligations of the counterparties in
each state. It also reflects the potentially significant back-end costs of monitoring
and enforcing compliance with these contracts. This incompleteness exposes
counterparties to the risk that their carefully designed contracts will fail to
prescribe the best possible outcomes in the states of the world that actually
materialize. It also exposes them to the risk of opportunism over the life of the
contract. Importantly, these risks are likely to be most pronounced during periods
of fundamental uncertainty in bad times when the markets for underlying
assets break down, when collateral is scarce and hard to value, and when doubts
arise about the creditworthiness of the counterparties. In bad times, the
determination of each counterparty's rights and obligations can thus become
highly uncertain and contested anything but automatic.
Counterparties employ a number of formal mechanisms to address the risks
posed by incomplete contracting.25 The first mechanism is the allocation of
property rights in the form of collateral. Collateralization can help insure parties
against unexpected changes in the price of underlying assets or the
creditworthiness of their counterparties. 26 It can also reduce each party's
exposure to opportunism by its counterparty. The second mechanism is the
22. The trends toward standardization, automation, and central clearing are examined
in greater detail in Part II.
23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. For the equivalent regulation in the European
Union, see Regulation (EU) 648/2012, of the European Parliament and European Council on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties, and Trade Repositories, 2012 O.J. (L 201) [hereinafter EMIR].
24. The sources of contractual incompleteness, the resulting risks, and the types of
mechanisms that contracting parties can use to address these risks are described in greater detail in Section
III.A.
25. These formal mechanisms and their interaction are described in greater detail in
Section III.B.
26. The nature and distinction between market and counterparty credit risk is described
in greater detail in Part I.
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allocation of decision-making rights. This includes the appointment of one
party known as the Valuation Agent for the purpose of determining how
much collateral counterparties are required to post. In good times, the role of the
Valuation Agent is essentially administrative: simply observing market prices
and other input variables and feeding them into the detailed state-contingent
terms embedded within every derivative contract. In bad times, however, the
Valuation Agent is called upon to use their expertise and discretion as a substitute
for objectively observable market information. The third mechanism is the
judicious use of broad contractual standards. Perhaps most importantly, these
standards are used to articulate a benchmark for evaluating the reasonableness
of the Valuation Agent's decisions.
These formal mechanisms for addressing the risks posed by incomplete
contracting are subject to several important limits. Collateral is expensive. The
valuation of many financial assets is notoriously complex and subjective. The
enforcement of broad contractual standards can be extremely costly and
unpredictable. These limitations point to a potentially significant role for more
informal mechanisms such reputation and the expectation offuture dealings.27
The threat of reputational sanctions and the loss of future revenue can incentivize
counterparties to engage in cooperative problem solving and contractual
renegotiation under circumstances where the rigid application of state-contingent
terms is either impracticable or would lead to suboptimal outcomes. These
mechanisms can also help constrain potential opportunism associated with the
ex ante allocation of property or decision-making rights. Together with more
formal mechanisms, these informal mechanisms can thus provide counterparties
with the flexibility to incorporate new information, fill contractual gaps, and
facilitate efficient ex post renegotiation. In this way, these informal mechanisms
can reinforce the more formal elements of a derivative contract: incentivizing the
use of detailed state-contingent terms and the allocation of property and decision-
making rights in good times by providing a safety valve for modifying or
relaxing the strict application of these terms in bad times.
Inevitably, these informal relational mechanisms have their own inherent
limits. As a preliminary matter, the strength of these mechanisms will typically
depend on a party's expected future revenue stream from a given relationship.
As the economic importance of a relationship declines, so too does the
probability that these mechanisms will effectively compel parties to engage in
cooperative problem solving and good faith renegotiation or deter them from
behaving opportunistically. For the same reason, these mechanisms are unlikely
to incentivize cooperation or constrain opportunism where a party suspects that
its counterparty is in the vicinity of insolvency or conversely where its own
survival is at stake.
501
27. These informal mechanisms and their interaction with the other elements of
derivative contracts are examined in greater detail in Part III.
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The effectiveness of both reputation and the expectation of future dealings
also relies on cooperative or opportunistic behavior being easily observable
within the marketplace. These mechanisms are thus less likely to work within
widely dispersed or opaque markets, or in the presence of pronounced
asymmetries of information and expertise. Along the same vein, the influence of
these mechanisms is likely to be relatively modest in the absence of meaningful
competition. The number of prospective counterparties increases the credibility
of a party's threat to take its business elsewhere in response to uncooperative or
opportunistic behavior. Finally, counterparties will often face powerful
countervailing incentives stemming from the use of collateral and from the
possibility that reputation and the expectation of future dealings may work at
cross purposes. Accordingly, while these informal mechanisms can help make
derivative contracts more resilient in the face of uncertainty, they do not
represent a complete solution to the problems of incomplete contracting.
The process of unbundling derivatives thus reveals a complex and
heterogeneous collection of different elements-a fundamentally hybrid
financial instrument. This hybridity enables derivative contracts to morph
between what economists Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have
characterized as "arm's-length" and relational financing depending on the state
of the world in which the counterparties find themselves.2 8 In good times,
derivative contracts trade in deep, liquid, and informationally sensitive markets.
In bad times, the very same contracts can be characterized by acute information
problems, paralyzing illiquidity, and the resulting dominance of relationships
over markets.
Highlighting the fundamental hybridity of derivative contracts yields a
number of important policy insights. First, the braiding of contract, property,
decision-making rights, and relational mechanisms makes derivatives look far
more like commercial loans than publicly traded shares, bonds, options, or
futures. The regulatory treatment of derivatives as "securities" under the Dodd-
Frank Act and the resulting emphasis on market transparency is thus
somewhat misguided and serves to distract regulatory attention from the
significant prudential risks posed by the widespread use of derivatives. Second,
the flexibility associated with the relational mechanisms embedded within many
derivative contracts can play a useful role in promoting both institutional and
broader financial stability. This has important implications in terms of the
desirability of mandatory central clearing of derivatives under the Dodd-Frank
Act, where the elimination of these mechanisms may leave clearinghouses and
other counterparties vulnerable to destabilizing contractual rigidity. This same
rigidity risks undermining the inherent promise of recent proposals to use
distributed ledger technology and smart contracts to execute, clear, and settle
28. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lesson from the East Asian
Crisis, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 40, 40-41 (1998) (explaining the distinction between arm's-length and
relational financing).
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derivative contracts. By the same token, the widespread breakdown of these
relational mechanisms can be a source of pronounced financial instability. This
provides a compelling rationale for authorizing central banks to act as "dealers
of last resort" during periods of fundamental uncertainty.
The failure of scholars and policymakers to fully appreciate the hybrid
nature of derivative contracts is also the source of a number of enduring
misunderstandings. These misunderstandings are reflected in the widespread and
erroneous belief that derivatives are zero sum bets on future price movements,
that central clearing of derivatives can eliminate their attendant risks, and that
derivatives are fundamentally no different from shares, bonds, or other financial
instruments. Lamentably, these beliefs continue to find their way into both policy
debates and the pages of leading law reviews.2 One of the objectives of this
Article is to correct these misunderstandings, thereby leaving us in a better
position to explore the important questions raised by the widespread use of
derivative contracts and the changing structure of derivatives markets.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the basic anatomy of
every derivative contract: their core building blocks, the nature and importance
of market and counterparty credit risk, and the mechanisms counterparties use to
manage these risks. Part II describes how derivatives work in good times, and
traces the intertwined trends toward greater standardization, automation, and
central clearing within derivatives markets. Part III then describes how
derivatives work in bad times. It begins by identifying the sources of incomplete
contracting, the risks that it poses to contracting parties, and the range of formal
and informal mechanisms that can theoretically be used to address these risks. It
then examines how these mechanisms are collectively used to address the risks
posed by incomplete contracting within derivatives markets. To help illuminate
how these mechanisms work, how they interact with one another, and their
inherent limits, this examination draws on a case study involving the
renegotiation of a portfolio of credit default swaps between Goldman Sachs and
AIG at the height of the financial crisis. Part IV concludes by examining some
of the important policy insights that flow from the hybrid nature of derivative
contracts.
I. The Anatomy of a Derivative Contract
There is no doubt that derivatives are complex.30 Yet beneath all the
sophisticated mathematics, impenetrable financial jargon, and dense legal
documentation resides a universal economic structure: the basic anatomy of
29. Some of these beliefs are examined in greater detail in Part I.
30. For an examination of the complexity of derivatives markets, see Awrey, supra note
15, at 245-58 (describing six drivers of complexity within derivatives markets: technology, opacity,
interconnectedness, fragmentation, regulation, and reflexivity).
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every derivative contract. This anatomy begins with the two building blocks
from which all derivatives are created: options and forwards. 3' An option gives
the holder a right to purchase or sell an asset at a predetermined price at some
point in the future.32 This right is then combined with an obligation on the part
of the option writer to buy or sell the asset, as applicable, upon the holder's
exercise of the option. A forward, meanwhile, represents a pair of reciprocal
obligations for one party to buy an asset, and the other party to sell it, at a
specified price and time.33 These two building blocks can be combined in an
infinite number of ways, in connection with virtually any underlying asset thus
theoretically making possible a nearly infinite variety of different derivative
contracts.
The anatomy of a derivative contract exposes the parties to two principal
risks. The first stems from movements in the price of an underlying asset or the
occurrence of a specified future event often referred to simply as the
"underlying."34 This underlying can be an individual stock or bond, a basket of
financial instruments, or a physical commodity. It can also be a benchmark
interest rate, currency exchange rate, financial index, or other more exotic
underlying. This exposure to movements in the price of the underlying is known
as market risk. The second stems from the prospect that a party will not be able
to perform its obligations under a derivative contract due to its default or
insolvency. This exposure of one party to the creditworthiness of the other is
known as counterparty credit risk. As we shall see, while derivatives expose the
parties to a myriad of other risks, it is the allocation and management of market
and counterparty credit risk that reside at the heart of every derivative contract.
In theory, the market risk associated with a derivative contract is
completely independent of the resulting counterparty credit risk.35 Indeed, the
price of the underlying can fluctuate wildly without any impact on the
creditworthiness of the counterparties. Conversely, significant changes in the
price of the underlying can be negated by the inability of a counterparty to honor
its commitments. This is a unique and important feature of derivative contracts.
As residual claims on the assets of a corporation, common shares do not generate
31. For a more detailed description of these basic building blocks and how they can be
combined to create more complex derivatives, see RICHARD FLAVELL, SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES,
(2d ed. 2009).
32. A right to purchase an asset is known as a "call" option; a right to sell an asset is
known as a "put" option.
33. Forwards either contemplate the actual delivery of the underlying (i.e., physical
settlement) or a payment based on movements in the price of the underlying (i.e., cash settlement).
34. Importantly, the precise relationship between movements in the price of the
underlying and the resulting payoffs to the counterparties are determined ex ante and enshrined in contract.
This serves to distinguish derivative contracts from other assets or claims-e.g., shares, bonds, or
dividends-the value of which are in some sense also "derived" from underlying assets.
35. In practice, of course, the two may be correlated where, for example, the exposure
under a derivative contract represents a significant proportion of a counterparty's total liabilities (where
adverse price movements in the underlying could have an impact on the counterparty's solvency).
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counterparty credit risk only market risk. Bonds and other fixed income
securities, meanwhile, bundle market and counterparty credit risk together-
with the market price of the securities inextricably linked with the
creditworthiness of the issuer.36 Unlike conventional equity and debt securities,
understanding how derivative contracts work thus demands that we draw a sharp
distinction between market and counterparty credit risk.
An example may help illuminate the basic economic structure of a
derivative contract, along with the important distinction between market and
counterparty credit risk. One of the most common types of derivative contracts
is an interest rate swap.37 A swap is a series of forwards whereby two
counterparties agree to periodically exchange cash flows over a specified period
of time. A "plain vanilla" interest rate swap involves one counterparty agreeing
to make payments at a fixed interest rate to another counterparty, who in turn
agrees to pay a "floating" rate typically based on a financial benchmark such as
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).3 8 In the example in Figure 2,
Counterparty A has agreed to pay a fixed rate of 5.0% every six months over a
period of five years, while Counterparty B has agreed to pay a floating rate of
Libor plus 2.0%. As the counterparty receiving the floating rate, Counterparty A
thus stands to benefit from any subsequent increase in interest rates, whereas
Counterparty B stands to benefit from any decline.
The periodic payments due under a swap are calculated with reference to a
"notional amount' ($10,000,000 in our example). The resulting obligations are
then netted out against one another so that only one counterparty is obligated to
make payment on the settlement date at the end of any given six-month period.
For example, where the prevailing LIBOR rate was 2.0% as of a particular
settlement date, Counterparty B would be entitled to payment from Counterparty
A in the amount of 5.0% - (LIBOR + 2.0%) = 1.0% x 10,000,000 = $100,000.
The obligation to make this payment would represent the crystallization of
Counterparty A's exposure to the market risk associated with upward
movements in LIBOR. Counterparty B is then exposed to the counterparty credit
risk stemming from the possibility that Counterparty A will not be able to
perform its payment obligation.
36. This exposes the inherent conceptual misunderstanding at the heart of proposals to
expand central clearing to debt instruments other than derivatives. See, e.g., Steven Schwarcz, Central
Clearing ofFinancial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications, 167 U PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019). As described in greater detail in Section IIC, the benefits of central clearing of derivatives flow
from the fact that clearinghouses concentrate counterparty credit risk, while leaving the original
counterparties exposed to market risk. This is not possible in other debt markets, where market and
counterparty credit risk cannot be separated (at least not without the use of a derivative!).
37. As of December 31, 2016, interest rate forwards and swaps represented
approximately 76% of the global OTC derivatives market. See Global OTC Derivatives, supra note 9.
38. As a result of several high-profile scandals involving the alleged manipulation of
LIBOR, the Bank of England has announced its plan to replace LIBOR with a new benchmark (SONIA)
based on more reliable market data. Transition to Sterling Risk-Free Rates from LIBOR, BANK OF ENG.,
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/transition-to-sterling-risk-free-rates-from-libor
[https://perma.cc/WLX2-CKUZ].
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Figure 2: A Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swap
Fixed rate (5.0%)
Counterparty A Counterparty B
Floating rate (Libor + 2.0%)
Swap terms:
Notional amount: $10,000,000
Fixed rate: 5%
Floating rate: Libor + 2%
Term: 5 years
Payment: semi-annually
The first thing that this example makes clear is that both market and
counterparty credit risk are a function of time. Under a typical swap contract, for
example, both counterparties will owe contingent obligations toward one another
over a period that may span several years.3 9 It is this passage of time that exposes
counterparties to price movements and introduces the risk that a counterparty
may default between the moment that the contract is entered into and the full and
complete performance of each counterparty's obligations. In turn, the prospect
of default or insolvency makes the creditworthiness and thus the identity-of
the counterparties highly relevant from a contracting perspective. Put bluntly,
the contractual commitments of some counterparties will be more credible than
others.
The passage of time has important implications in terms of the ongoing
costs of contractual monitoring and enforcement. First, counterparties must be
able to observe movements in the market price of the underlying over time.40
Where the underlying is a publicly traded stock or widely published financial
benchmark, the costs of observing these price movements may be negligible.
However, where the underlying is traded in less liquid or more opaque markets,
where the markets for the underlying have broken down, or where "price" is a
function of sophisticated financial modeling, these observation costs may be very
significant. Along the same vein, it may be costly to observe the occurrence of
events-e.g., the default of a corporation on its debt-designed to trigger
payouts under a derivative contract. Second, the duration of derivative contracts,
along with the corresponding exposure to counterparty credit risk, theoretically
generate powerful incentives for parties to engage in ex ante screening of the
39. As of December 2016, the BIS reported that over half of all interest rate and equity-
linked swaps and roughly a quarter of all foreign exchange swaps were for durations of greater than one
year. OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2016, BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS 6-7 (May 2017),
https://www.bis.org/publ/otc hyl705.pdf[https://perma.cc/YR7K-3XDT].
40. Or, at the very least, as of each contemplated settlement date.
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creditworthiness of potential counterparties.4 Thereafter, it also incentivizes
them to engage in ex post monitoring of their counterparties over the life of a
derivative contract. These investments in screening and monitoring can be very
costly, especially where the counterparties are large, complex financial
institutions. 2
The second thing that our example makes clear is that derivatives are a form
of debt. In our example, where LIBOR interest rates are above three percent as
of any given settlement date, Counterparty B will owe Counterparty A a
specified sum of money. The leverage embedded within derivative contracts is
also reflected in how they are used. Thus, for example, a party might enter into
a five-year total return equity swap on shares of Apple Inc. with a notional value
of $10 million, in exchange for which it will be required to make semi-annual
payments of 5.0% to its counterparty. Where the price subsequently increases,
the party will be entitled to payment from its counterparty equal to the capital
appreciation and any dividends on $10 million worth of Apple shares. Where the
price falls, however, the party will be required to pay its counterparty an amount
commensurate with this decline. From an economic perspective, this derivative
contract is thus identical to simply borrowing $10 million at a 5.0% interest rate
and then investing the proceeds in Apple shares.
The last thing that our example makes clear is that the motivation for
entering into a derivative contract stems from each counterparty's desire to
acquire or hedge an exposure to a particular market risk whether it be the future
direction of interest rates, share prices, or the prospect that a corporation will
default on its debt. Counterparty credit risk is simply a necessary by-product: the
price counterparties must pay in order to use derivatives to acquire or hedge this
exposure. That counterparty credit risk is essentially a necessary evil is crucial
in terms of understanding the legal and economic structure of derivative
contracts, from the simplest option, forward, or swap, to the most complex
structured product.
Counterparties use a variety of mechanisms to mitigate counterparty credit
risk.43 The first is payment netting. Where counterparties have reciprocal
exposures under multiple derivative contracts, payment netting contemplates the
aggregation of payment obligations across these contracts and the cancelation of
41. Although, as we shall see, the collateralization of derivative contracts, along with
the safe harbors for derivatives under corporate bankruptcy law, can be viewed as significantly
undercutting these incentives.
42. This intuition is supported by the empirical research of Donald Morgan, who finds
an unusual pattern of disagreement-or "splits" between credit rating agencies over the ratings of banks
and insurance firms. See Donald Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 874 (2002). Morgan attributes this disagreement to the high costs of observing the quality
of these firms' assets and the nature of their trading activities. Id. Compounding matters, because no two
counterparties are identical, the idiosyncratic nature of these investments means that they are likely to be
largely unrecoverable. See Oliver Williamson, Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233, 239-45 (1979).
43. See JOHN ARMOURET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 469-70 (2016);
see also Awrey, supra note 13, at 1148-52.
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any offsetting payments due in the same currency and on the same settlement
date. In effect, payment netting converts multiple gross payments owed by both
counterparties into a single net payment owed by only one them (see Figure 3).
By eliminating the requirement for both counterparties to exchange gross
payments, payment netting thus avoids so-called "daylight" exposures where the
sequential performance of payment obligations would otherwise expose the
counterparty that pays first to the risk that its counterparty will subsequently
default. Perhaps more importantly, by reducing the overall number and size of
payments, payment netting reduces each party's outstanding exposure in the
event that its counterparty is unable to perform its payment obligations.
Figure 3: Derivatives Payment Netting
Fixed rate (5.0%)
Counterparty A Contract 1 Counterparty B
Floating rate (Libor + 2.0%)
Fixed rate (6.5%)
Counterparty A Contract 2 Counterparty B
Floating rate (Libor + 3.0%)
Swap (payment netting) terms:
Gross amount (Contract 1): [5% - (2.5% + 2%)] x $10,000,000 = $50,000 to B
Gross amount (Contract 2): [6.5% - (2.5% + 3%)] x $10,000,000 = $100,000 to A
Net amount: $100,000 - $50,000 = $50,000 toA
The second mechanism used to mitigate counterparty credit risk is closeout
netting. Closeout netting involves the termination, valuation, and netting out of
contractual obligations in the event of a counterparty's default or insolvency.44
Where the netted closeout amount puts the non-defaulting counterparty in the
money, closeout netting entitles this party to immediately seize (as necessary)4 5
44. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of closeout netting, see David
Mengle, Closeout Netting and Risk Management in Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Working Paper, June
1, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1619480 [https://perma.cc/Y328-KVEZ].
45. The precise operation of closeout netting will depend on whether the relevant
collateral was posted pursuant to a title transfer or security interest system. Under a title transfer system,
there is technically no need for a non-defaulting counterparty to "seize" the relevant collateral upon default
as the non-defaulting counterparty or its delegate will already be in possession of it. For further details
regarding the distinction between title transfer and security interest systems, see FIRTH, supra note 16, §§
6-7-6-15.
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and liquidate any collateral posted by the defaulting counterparty in satisfaction
of this amount. 6 Where the defaulting counterparty is in the money, closeout
netting entitles the non-defaulting party to set off against the amount it owes to
the defaulting counterparty any amounts owed to it by the defaulting
counterparty. Importantly, the enforceability of closeout netting relies on a
series of safe harbors from the automatic stay and fraudulent preference rules
under applicable corporate bankruptcy laws.48
The final mechanism used to mitigate counterparty credit risk is collateral.
The parties to derivative contracts will often seek to minimize their residual net
exposures after payment netting by requiring their counterparties to post
collateral at the outset of the contract. This collateral, often referred to as "initial
margin," is theoretically designed to reflect each party's exposure to the default
or insolvency of its counterparty over the duration of the contract. Thereafter,
counterparties also periodically recalculate the amount of collateral that one or
both counterparties are required to post. This "variation margin" is designed to
reflect changes in the market price of the underlying. Returning to our earlier
example, in the event that LIBOR were to increase from 2.5% to 4.0% during
the period between two settlement dates, variation margin requirements would
require Counterparty B to post collateral to Counterparty A as security against
its potential future payment obligations (see Figure 4). Like closeout netting, the
enforceability of these collateral arrangements relies on safe harbors under
applicable corporate bankruptcy laws.
Figure 4: Derivatives Variation Margin Requirements
Fixed rate (5.0%)
Counterparty A Counterparty B
Floating rate (Libor + 2.0%)
Swap (variation margin) terms:
Timing: daily mark-to-market
Methodology: full collateralization of residual net exposures
Amount due to : [(4% +2%) - 5%] x $10,000,000 = $100,000
46. With any residual amounts owed generally being treated as an unsecured claim
against the defaulting counterparty's estate. See Mengle, supra note 44, at 3.
47. This setoff is available irrespective of whether the amounts owed to the non-
defaulting counterparty relate to derivatives trades or other obligations.
48. For a detailed description of these safe harbors and the debate that surrounds them,
see Edwards & Morrison, supra note 11; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10; Roe, supra note 11. For further
information about the equivalent safe harbors in the United Kingdom and European Union, see HUDSON,
supra note 16.
509
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 36, 2019
In theory, payment netting, closeout netting, and collateral can eliminate a
party's exposure to counterparty credit risk. Specifically, where a party is fully
collateralized and can legally and instantaneously enforce closeout netting upon
the default of its counterparty, these mechanisms will put the non-defaulting
counterparty in essentially the same position as it would have been had its
counterparty not defaulted. These mechanisms thus combine to render parties
economically indifferent to the creditworthiness of their counterparties, thereby
eliminating any incentive to engage in costly screening or monitoring. Viewed
from this perspective, these mechanisms can be understood as substitutes for
investments in evaluating counterparty credit risk, leaving the parties in what
Bengt Holmstrom has characterized as a state of "symmetric ignorance" about
the credibility of their counterparty's commitment to perform their payment and
other obligations.4 9
In reality, these contractual mechanisms are unlikely to completely insulate
parties against the risk of counterparty default or insolvency. As a preliminary
matter, closeout netting and collateral do not eliminate counterparty credit risk:
they simply transform it into market risk in the posted collateral. In order to fully
protect counterparties, the value of this collateral must at least equal the amount
owed to the non-defaulting counterparty after the application of closeout netting
in each and every potential future state of the world. For this reason, the most
effective types of collateral are extremely liquid and informationally insensitive
debt such as cash and highly-rated sovereign debt. 0 Ideally, the value of this
collateral should also not be correlated with the price of the underlying or the
creditworthiness of the counterparty required to post it. While available data
suggests that cash is the most frequently used form of collateral within derivative
markets,5 the costs of posting cash have increased considerably in the wake of
the financial crisis.52 Meanwhile, counterparties using more informationally
49. See Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role ofDebt in the Financial System 6
(BIS Working Paper No. 479, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR4Y-
Y45K]; Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 424 (2017). While
Holmstrom was writing in relation to money markets, his analysis also accurately describes the
information cost dynamics of closeout netting and collateralization within derivatives markets.
50. See Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, Collateral Crises, 104 AM. ECON. REV.
343 (2014); Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmstrom, Ignorance, Debt and the Financial Crisis
(Working Paper, Mar. 2013) (on file with author); Holmstrom, supra note 49.
51. Respondents to ISDA's 2015 margin survey reported that 76.6% of collateral
received and 77.7% of collateral delivered in connection with bilaterally cleared derivatives contracts was
in the form of cash. See ISDA Margin Survey 2015, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.isda.org/a/0eiDE/margin-survey-2015-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3TP-M843].
52. The increasing cost of posting cash and other high-quality liquid assets in the wake
of the financial crisis is principally due to new regulatory requirements that mandate or incentivize
financial institutions to hold a larger stock of these assets. These requirements include the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio introduced under Basel III, new initial and variation margin requirements for derivatives,
and restrictions on the reuse and rehypothecation of collateral. See Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio
and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Jan. 2013),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [https://perma.cc/S879-PV86]; Margin Requirements for Non-
510
Split Derivatives
sensitive and hence more volatile forms of collateral such as lower-quality
sovereign debt, corporate bonds, or equity securities will inevitably expose
themselves to the risk that they will be unable to sell the collateral at a price that
fully covers their residual net exposure to defaulting counterparties. 3 Given the
opportunity costs of posting collateral, counterparties may also rationally elect
not to fully collateralize their residual net exposures.54 Indeed, while available
data is scarce, it is likely that a significant fraction of derivative contracts have
historically not been fully collateralized." Last but not least, non-defaulting
counterparties face the risk known as "replacement" risk that they will be
unable to enter into an economically equivalent derivative contract with a new
and more creditworthy counterparty. Where any of these risks materializes, the
default or insolvency of one counterparty will leave the other counterparty in a
worse position than it would have been had the defaulting counterparty continued
to perform its payment and other obligations.
The high costs of screening, monitoring, and mitigating counterparty credit
risk have had an important impact on the structure of derivatives markets.
Derivatives markets are loosely organized around a small group of large financial
institutions known colloquially as "dealers." Prominent derivative dealers
include Citigroup, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC.5 6
These dealers quote bid and asking prices to prospective counterparties on the
Centrally Cleared Derivatives, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & INT'L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM'NS (Mar. 2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs261.pdf [https://perma.cc/6665-MJDY];
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation ofShadow Banking: Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow
Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r 130829b.pdf7pagemoved=1
[https://perma.cc/QBZ2-2STN]. Many of these requirements have been incorporated into U.S. law. See,
e.g., Margin Requirements for Covered Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,
81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6, 2016); Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed.
Reg. 74,840 (Nov. 30, 2015); Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 179 (Oct. 10, 2014).
53. To address this risk, counterparties can apply a discount (or "haircut") to the value
of non-cash collateral. The size of the haircut will typically reflect the historical volatility in the price of
the collateral assets. See Part II, infra for a more detailed description of the contractual terms
operationalizing these haircuts.
54. As described in Section IIA, counterparties can do this by agreeing to a "threshold"
specifying the size of the residual net exposure below which collateral will not need to be posted. They
can also agree to "Minimum Transfer Amounts" that eliminate the obligation to post collateral below a
specified amount.
55. See Manmohan Singh, Under-Collateralization and Rehypothecation in the OTC
Derivatives Markets, 14 BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV. (July 2010). Singh estimates that the
top five derivative dealers in each of the United States and Europe were collectively under-collateralized
by as much as $1.2 trillion as of December 2008. Id. at 114.
56. The fourteen largest global derivative dealers are collectively known as the "G14."
The G14 is comprised of Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Soci6t6
G6n6rale, UBS, and Wells Fargo. Commerzbank, Credit Agricole and/or Nomura Securities are
sometimes added to create the "G16" or "G17." More recently, large asset managers such as BlackRock
have also started dealing in derivatives. See David McCrum & Michael Mackenzie, BlackRock Looks to
Take On Wall Street, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2012).
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understanding that they are willing to take either side of the contemplated
contract. 7 Returning once again to our example, a dealer might quote
Counterparty B a bid of 5.0% and an ask of 5.05% on the fixed leg of our plain
vanilla interest rate swap. The quoted bid represents the gross interest rate that
Counterparty B would receive if it were to elect to take the fixed leg of the swap,
while the quoted ask represents the rate it would be required to pay if it were to
take the floating leg. The dealer will then typically look to hedge its exposure by
seeking out and entering into one or more offsetting swaps with other
counterparties." In theory at least, dealers thus attempt to profit not by placing
bets on the future direction of prices, but by charging a fee typically embedded
in the spread between the quoted bid and asking prices-for their willingness to
stand on the opposite side of the contract. 59 The end result is two separate
contracts: the first between the dealer and Counterparty B, and the second
mirroring the first between the dealer and Counterparty A (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Dealer Intermediation within Derivatives Markets
Fixed rate (5.0%) Fixed rate (5.05%)
Counterparty A Contract 2 Dealer Contract 1 Counterparty B
Floating rate (Libor + 2.0%) Floating rate (Libor + 2.0%)
Dealers can thus be understood as performing two distinct and important
roles within derivatives markets.60 The first is to assist parties in identifying
potential counterparties willing to take the opposite side of a derivative contract.
Dealers are typically large commercial and investment banks whose business
involves understanding their clients' business models, risk management and
57. See Dan Awrey, The Limits ofPrivate Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 183,202 (2015). These quotes can take the form of either binding or indicative
(non-binding) quotes.
58. And in many cases other dealers. As of December 2016, the BIS reported that
roughly 30% of foreign exchange derivatives, 20% of equity-linked derivatives, and 5% of interest rate
derivatives were entered into between two dealers. BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 39, at 5-7.
59. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics ofDealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 51,
56 (2010). Where permitted by law, dealers may also enter into "proprietary" derivatives trades on the
basis of their expectations regarding the future direction of prices in the relevant underlying.
60. The nature of these roles is examined in greater detail in Awrey, supra note 13, at
1139-46.
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financing needs, and general creditworthiness. Armed with this information,
dealers can then use their large client networks to identify and match
counterparties whose desire to acquire or hedge an exposure to a specific
underlying correspond with one another. Viewed from this perspective, dealers
play a central role in the aggregation of information about the supply and demand
for different derivative contracts, thereby reducing the search costs for parties
looking to identify potentially suitable counterparties.
The second role relates directly to the management of counterparty credit
risk. In our example, Counterparties A and B may initially possess very little
information about each other. They may also be commercial firms that do not
possess the financial expertise or other resources necessary to effectively screen
or monitor their counterparties. These problems leave the parties extremely
vulnerable to counterparty default, along with the risk of opportunism over the
life of the contract. One way to manage these risks is to contractually interpose
a dealer between the two counterparties. While dealers will still be exposed to
the same risks, they also possess high levels of financial expertise, have large
and diversified balance sheets, and enjoy access to multiple sources of market
liquidity.6 ' This gives dealers a comparative advantage in terms of being able to
evaluate and absorb counterparty credit, market, and other risks, and to hedge
any residual exposures. It also enables them to bridge any temporal gaps between
the needs of any two counterparties.6 Perhaps most importantly, the status of
dealers as repeat players within derivatives markets can impose reputational
constraints that make them less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. As
we shall see, this enables dealers to play an important role as reputational
intermediaries: pledging their reputations to counterparties as a means of
reducing information, agency, and other costs, and thereby strengthening the
credibility of the commitments underpinning derivative contracts.63
The concentrated structure of derivatives markets has enabled dealers to
exert enormous influence over both the structure and substantive content of
derivative contracts, along with the legislative regimes supporting the
enforceability of payment netting, closeout netting, and collateral arrangements.
61. Market liquidity in this context refers to the ease with which a party is able to enter
into a derivative contract acquiring or hedging a particular exposure. It is typically measured on the basis
of time and cost. For a general discussion of market liquidity, see Markus Brunnermeier & Lasse Pedersen,
Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2001 (2009).
62. In this way, dealers help overcome the classic "double coincidence of wants"
problem that we might otherwise expect to observe within derivatives markets-especially with respect
to more specialized or bespoke contracts. For the classic formulation of this problem, see WILLIAM
JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM OF EXCHANGE (1875) (describing the role of money in
overcoming this problem).
63. For a discussion of the role of dealers as reputational intermediaries, see Awrey,
supra note 13, at 1142. For a discussion of reputational intermediaries generally, see Ron Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984). In this way, the
reputation of derivative dealers can serve as yet another substitute for costly investments in information
regarding the creditworthiness of prospective counterparties.
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Over time, this has resulted in the development of highly sophisticated state-
contingent contracts designed to allocate and manage market, counterparty
credit, and other risks. In the next Section, we examine these contracts in greater
detail. We also examine the historical drive toward the greater standardization of
derivative contracts, along with the more recent trends toward automation and
central clearing within derivatives markets.
II. Derivatives in Good Times
The basic anatomy of a derivative contract is embodied within a legal
architecture that includes some of the world's most sophisticated state-
contingent contracting. 64 Distilled to its essence, a state-contingent contract is
one that identifies a potential future state of the world and then prescribes the
rights and obligations of the contracting parties in that state. 65 State-contingent
contracts are thus characterized by a basic modus ponens structure: ifa specified
state (x) materializes, then this will give rise to a pre-determined bundle of rights
and obligations (y). A relatively straightforward example of a state-contingent
contract is a "bonus" payment conditional upon an employee meeting specified
performance targets. Other examples include insurance policies, wagering
agreements, and representation, warranty, and indemnity clauses contained in
commercial agreements. In the case of derivative contracts, the most important
of these state-contingent terms govern each counterparty's payment and delivery
obligations, the circumstances in which they will be required to post collateral,
and the consequences of counterparty default or insolvency. The basic mechanics
of these terms are described in Section II.A.
The development of sophisticated state-contingent contracts is the product
of several decades of sustained coordination amongst derivatives dealers and
other counterparties. Spearheaded by industry trade associations such as ISDA,
this coordination has resulted in a high degree of contractual standardization
within derivatives markets. While it is difficult to measure with any real
certainty, it has been estimated that upwards of ninety percent of all swaps are
documented using ISDA Master Agreements and related documentation.66
Combined with advancements in information technology, this standardization
has facilitated an increasing degree of automation within derivatives markets,
dramatically streamlining the process of trade execution, clearing, and
settlement. It has also laid the foundations for the central clearing of derivatives
contracts as mandated under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. The trend toward
64. While outside the scope of this Article, this legal architecture also includes the safe
harbors from automatic stay and fraudulent transfer provisions under corporate bankruptcy law referred
to in Part I.
65. See Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Disintegration andInterfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 452 (2009).
66. See Henderson, supra note 16, at 803.
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automation within derivatives markets is described in Section II.B. The recent
push toward central clearing of derivatives contracts is described in Section II.C.
The intertwined trends toward greater standardization, automation, and
central clearing have contributed to the widespread perception that derivatives
contracts are becoming more commoditized, more transparent, and more
liquid in short, more like publicly-traded shares, bonds, options, and futures.67
Indeed, in many states of the world, this perception borders on reality.
Specifically, where market participants are fundamentally solvent and the
underlying markets are stable and liquid, thousands of derivatives contracts are
executed, cleared, and settled without a hitch each and every business day.6 8 Yet
adopting a narrow understanding of how derivative contracts work during these
good times risks fostering a misleading impression about how they work when
markets break down, when collateral is scarce and hard to value, or when doubts
arise about the solvency of counterparties. It is during these bad times that the
limits of state-contingent contracting become apparent, and where other formal
and informal mechanisms may be necessary in order to buttress the credibility of
the commitments underpinning derivative contracts. The braiding of state-
contingent contracting with these other mechanisms is described in greater detail
in Part III.
A. Highly Sophisticated and Standardized State-Contingent Contracting
The origins of modem derivatives markets can be traced back to the Bretton
Woods system of international monetary and exchange rate management
established in the closing days of World War 11.69 The Bretton Woods system
played two pivotal roles in the emergence and development of derivatives
markets. First, the system imposed strict capital and foreign exchange controls
designed to prevent cross-border capital and currency flows that might
67. A related trend has been the migration of trade execution in connection with some
highly standardized derivative contracts to so-called "swap execution facilities." See Evangelos Benos,
Richard Payne & Michalis Vasios, Centralized Trading, Transparency and Interest Rate Swap Market
Liquidity: Evidence from the Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act (Bank of Eng. Staff Working Paper
No. 580, 2016), https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/18 benos.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2ML-
MZDY]. For a more detailed description of this trend-sometimes referred to as "swap futurization"-
and its regulatory drivers, see Gabriel Rosenberg & Jai Massari, Regulation Through Substitution as
Policy Tool: Swap Futurization Under Dodd-Frank, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667.
68. Respondents to the latest ISDA Operations Benchmarking Survey, conducted in
2013, reported processing an average of 30,285 "events" per month (with GI5 dealers processing an
average of 109,642 events per month). See ISDA Operations Benchmarking Survey, ISDA 5 (April 2013),
https://www.isda.org/a/JeiDE/obs-2013-final-0425.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT95-7G55]. "Events" for these
purposes include trade executions, payment and netting calculations, collateral calls, events of default and
termination events, and early terminations.
69. For a more detailed history of the emergence of modern derivatives markets against
the backdrop of the Bretton Woods system, see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEw LOMBARD STREET: How
THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 71-75 (2013).
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destabilize the system's fixed exchange rate regime.70 Firms seeking to shift
capital from one country to another-e.g., for the purposes of building a new
plant or capitalizing a new subsidiary were able to circumvent these controls
by entering into so-called "parallel loans."' These loans were the forbearers of
modern swaps.72 Second, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system during
the early 1970s was accompanied by a period of high inflation and exchange rate
volatility. 73 This volatility stimulated demand for new financial instruments that
would enable firms to more effectively manage the resulting interest rate and
foreign exchange risks.74
By the early 1980s, demand for derivatives was being met by a small group
of dealers operating primarily in the United States and United Kingdom. These
dealers offered a relatively modest range of basic derivatives.75 These early
derivatives were documented in ad hoc agreements drafted and negotiated on a
transaction-by-transaction basis.7 6 Yet as demand for derivatives continued to
grow, so too did the time, effort, and back office infrastructure needed to execute,
clear, and settle these transactions. The result was a significant transactional
backlog, along with a predictable decrease in dealer profit margins.78 This
backlog spurred dealers on both sides of the Atlantic to establish working groups
with the objective of developing standard terms for use in connection with the
most common derivative contracts.79 In New York, dealers formed a
Documentary Committee in May 1984 in order to explore the possibility of
standardizing legal documentation within the nascent interest rate swap market.80
70. This regime, known as the "Gold-Exchange Standard," fixed the price at which the
currency of each member state could be converted into U.S. dollars. In turn, the price at which the U.S.
dollar could be converted into gold was fixed at $35 per ounce. The rationale for the Bretton Woods
capital and foreign exchange controls was essentially that, absent these controls, capital and currency
would move freely to whichever countries offered the best investment opportunities. The free movement
of capital and currency would inevitably put strain on the commitment to maintain fixed exchange rates,
thus undermining the credibility of the Bretton Woods system.
71. For a detailed description of how parallel loans worked, see FLAVELL, supra note
31, at 1.
72. See id. at 1-3; MEHRLING, supra note 69, at 71-75.
73. For a more detailed description of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and
its impact, see Peter Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System, in A
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
461 (Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
74. Awrey, supra note 13, at 1140.
75. Principally interest rate and foreign exchange swaps, options, and forwards. FIRTH,
supra note 16, § 10-1.
76. Norman Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 17 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 677, 736 (2002).
77. FIRTH, supra note 16, § 10-1.
78. Id.
79. Id. at § § 10-1-10-2.
80. In the United Kingdom, the equivalent role was performed by a committee working
under the auspices of the British Bankers Association (BBA). Id. This committee produced the BBA
Interest Rate Swap (BBAIRS) terms. See BBA, Interest Rate Swap Terms (Aug. 1985) (on file with
author).
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This committee provided the institutional foundations for what would become
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).'
Established in 1985, ISDA is the de facto trade association for the global
derivatives industry. ISDA's first contribution to the development of
standardized legal documentation was the 1985 publication of its Code of
Standard Wording, Assumptions, and Provisions for Swaps,83 essentially a
glossary of standard terms reflecting then-existing practice within the U.S.
interest rate swap market.8 4 In 1987, ISDA commenced publication of
standardized "master" agreements for interest rate swaps and currency swaps.
These Master Agreements incorporated multiple future transactions between two
counterparties under the umbrella of a single legal relationship. Over time, ISDA
has expanded the scope of these Master Agreements to include equity,
commodity, credit, and other derivatives.85 These Master Agreements have
dramatically reduced the drafting, negotiation, and other transaction costs
associated with the preparation of the legal documentation used in connection
with derivatives transactions.
Today, the vast majority of derivatives are documented using either the
1992 or 2002 ISDA Master Agreement. 86 The ISDA Master Agreement consists
of a pre-printed form of standard terms, accompanied by a schedule that enables
counterparties to amend these terms and make certain tax, documentary, and
other elections. The Master Agreement and schedule codify the legal relationship
between the counterparties separate and apart from the legal and economic terms
governing any specific transaction. This structure reflects an attempt to balance
contractual certainty and flexibility: with the Master Agreement and schedules
articulating the basic parameters within which the counterparties enter into
individual transactions. The transactions themselves are then documented in
trade confirmations setting out the relevant economic terms, calculation
81. FIRTH, supra note 16, § 10-2.
82. Today, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) represents
approximately 850 member dealers, institutional investors, governments, and other major counterparties.
See AboutlSDA, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-ISDA [https://perma.cc/6SWG-TAPS].
83. See Code of Standard Wording, Assumptions, and Provisions for Swaps, ISDA,
https://www.isda.org/book/1985-code-of-standard-wording-assumptions-and-provisions-for-swaps/
[https://perma.cc/C8PY-QS2P] [hereinafter SWAPS CODE].
84. Feder, supra note 76, at 737.
85. ISDA has also developed a series of protocols that facilitate the ex post amendment
of existing Master Agreements with a view to, inter alia, responding to jurisprudential developments,
rectifying perceived technical deficiencies and, more generally, standardizing market practice. See
Protocols, ISDA, https://www.isda.org/protocols/_[https://perma.cc/QV8D-3SG8].
86. 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, ISDA, https://www.isda.org/book/2002-isda-
master-agreement-english [https://perma.cc/F8JE-5LJC] [hereinafter ISDA Master Agreement]. While a
significant number of derivative contracts are still documented using the 1992 Master Agreement, all
references to the ISDA Master Agreement in this Article will (unless otherwise indicated) be to the 2002
Master Agreement.
87. FIRTH, supra note 16, §§ 10-5-10-6.
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mechanics, and payment and delivery obligations." In order to reduce
transaction costs and promote standardization, ISDA has also published a series
of booklets, definitions, and other terms that can be incorporated by reference
into trade confirmations governing a number of common derivatives
transactions. 89 Together, the Master Agreement, schedule, and trade
confirmations are deemed to form a single agreement. 90 In the event of
inconsistencies between these documents, a trade confirmation prevails over the
schedule, which in turn prevails over the Master Agreement. 9 1
ISDA also publishes a series of standard agreements known generically
as credit support agreements (CSAs)-that govern when and how counterparties
will be required to post collateral.92 These CSAs are tailored to reflect differences
in domestic legal regimes governing the transfer of collateral assets including,
perhaps most importantly, whether these transfers take place under a title transfer
or security interest system. 93 ISDA has also published Collateral Asset
Definitions that contain standardized descriptions of the most commonly used
collateral assets.94 According to the 2015 ISDA Margin Survey, the utilization
of CSAs varies across different types of transactions: ranging from a high of over
90% for equity and credit derivatives, to a low of under 60% for commodity
derivatives. 95
88. Confirmations may also amend provisions of the Master Agreement as they apply
to a specific transaction.
89. FIRTH, supra note 16, § § 10-6-10-7.
90. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 1(c).
91. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 1(b).
92. These agreements-include the English law Credit Support Annex, English law
Credit Support Deed, New York law Credit Support Annex, and Japanese law Credit Support Annex. For
a full list of the CSAs published by ISDA, see ISDA Credit Support Documentation, ISDA,
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-users.aspx. [https://perma.cc/QSQ3-QX8D]. In 2001, ISDA
also published standardized Margin Provisions that could be used in place of a CSA. See 2001 Margin
Provisions Streamline Collateral Process, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N (May 16, 2001) (on file
with author). To date, however, these Margin Provisions have not gained widespread acceptance within
the marketplace. FIRTH, supra note 16, §§ 10-6 and 12-39.
93. For a discussion of the legal and practical differences between title transfer and
security interest systems, see FIRTH, supra note 16, §§ 6-7-6-33. In a nutshell, whereas title transfer
systems contemplate the outright transfer of collateral assets from the collateral provider to the collateral
taker, security interest systems contemplate a mere pledge in favor of the collateral taker.
94. See Collateral Asset Definitions, ISDA (June 2003),
http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/isdacollateralassetdef.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XSY-ZB6H].
95. See Margin Survey, supra note 51, at 12.
518
Vol. 36, 2019
Split Derivatives
Figure 6: ISDA's Contractual Architecture
ISDA Standard Form Function
Master Agreement Sets out the basic legal relationship between two
counterparties
Schedule Enables counterparties to amend the master agreement and to
make certain elections
Trade Confirmation Sets out the economic terms, calculation mechanics, and
payment and delivery obligations for individual transactions
Booklets, Definitions, and Terms Provides standardized definitions and other terms for trade
confirmations in connection with common transactions
Credit Support Agreement Defines the circumstances in which counterparties will be
required to post or transfer collateral as part of a transaction
Highly sophisticated state-contingent contracting is evident throughout the
ISDA Master Agreement, CSAs, and trade confirmations. This sophistication
begins with the basic payment and delivery obligations. As described above, the
market risk associated with every derivative contract revolves around one or
more state-contingent terms: if x, then y. As we have seen, x can be the price of
an asset at a given point in time, an event of default in connection with a
corporate bond, or just about any other imaginable future state of the world.
Upon the occurrence of x, y is then the corresponding obligation to deliver the
underlying or, more typically, to pay a specified sum of money.96
On the surface, these basic payment and delivery obligations may seem
relatively straightforward.97 In practice, however, things can and do go very
wrong. In order to proactively address some of the potential problems, ISDA
documentation supplements these basic obligations with more detailed
provisions around the mechanics of payment and delivery in the event of various
contingencies. Trade confirmations, for example, typically stipulate each party's
obligations in the event that payment or delivery becomes impossible due to the
breakdown of the relevant payment or securities settlement systems.98 Trade
confirmations contemplating payments in emerging market currencies,
meanwhile, will often identify an alternative payment currency for use in the
96. Along with the corresponding right to receive payment or delivery.
97. This is reflected in the ISDA Master Agreement, which stipulates that-in the
absence of anything to the contrary in the trade confirmation payments and deliveries are to be made
"in the manner customary" for the relevant payment or delivery obligation. ISDA Master Agreement,
supra note 86, § 2(a)(ii).
98. See, e.g., ISDA Equity Derivative Definitions § 9.4,
https://www.isda.org/book/2011-isda-equity-derivatives-definitions-and-appendix/
fhttps://perma.cc/U2PM-4N66; 1997 ISDA Government Bond Option Definitions § 6.2,
https://www.isda.org/book/1 997-isda-government-bond-option-definitions/ [https://perma.cc/8MAX-
244D]. The ISDA Master Agreement also includes detailed provisions around the compensation payable
to a party in the event that its counterparty fails to make a payment or delivery. See ISDA Master
Agreement, supra note 86, §§ 9(h)(i)(1)-(2), 9(h)(i)(14) (defining "Default Rate").
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event that the government issuing the original payment currency imposes foreign
exchange controls or other restrictions.99 These and other provisions enable the
continued performance of each counterparty's payment and delivery obligations
in circumstances where the failure to provide for these contingencies ex ante
might otherwise impede the smooth and efficient operation of derivatives
markets.
The ISDA Master Agreement also employs state-contingent contracting to
implement payment netting. Where a transaction contemplates that payments are
to be made by both counterparties on the same day, and in the same currency,
the Master Agreement provides that payments will automatically be replaced
with a single net payment to the counterparty that would have otherwise been
obligated to pay the smaller of the two amounts.' At the election of the
counterparties, payment netting can then be extended to payments made on same
day and in the same currency across multiple transactions.' 0 ' Through the
automatic application of payment netting, the Master Agreement serves to reduce
the number and size of payment obligations, thereby streamlining the payment
process and minimizing each party's exposure to counterparty default.
A second even more sophisticated set of state-contingent terms govern
the obligations of the counterparties under a CSA. In general, counterparties
enjoy a great deal of flexibility in the design of collateral arrangements. ISDA's
published CSAs include a number of elections regarding, inter alia, the frequency
of margin calculations, threshold and minimum transfer amounts, and the
identity of eligible collateral assets.'0 2 Nevertheless, ISDA has in recent years
taken steps to encourage the standardization of CSAs. 0 3 As a result, these
collateral arrangements have increasingly come to employ a common structure
and terminology.
As described in Part I, the collateral posted under a derivative contract falls
into one of two categories. The first is initial margin. Initial margin referred to
99. FIRTH, supra note 16, § 11-6. For an example of what can happen if the
counterparties fail to specify an alternative payment or delivery mechanism, see Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1989] Q.B. 728. Libyan Arab involved a U.S. dollar account held by the
claimant with the London branch of Bankers Trust. Payments in connection with this account were
typically made by way of book transfer in New York. When this became illegal under an Executive Order
freezing Libyan property in the United States, the claimant demanded payment in London. The court held
that, as there was no express or implied term in the contract requiring payment by way of book transfer,
the claimant could demand payment in cash at the branch where the account was held. Given the sums
involved, payment in cash was entirely impractical. Id.
100. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 2(c).
101. Id. This election is made in the trade confirmation.
102. See, e.g., the elections set out in paragraph 13 of the New York law CSA.
103. See, e.g., 2013 Best Practices for the OTC Derivatives Collateral Process, ISDA
(Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.isda.org/a/rLDDE/2013-isda-best-practices-for-the-otc-derivatives-
collateral-process-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5WV-7GC8]. ISDA has also published a standard CSA.
See ISDA Publishes 2013 Standard CSA (SCSA), ISDA (June 7, 2013),
https://www.isda.org/2013/06/07/isda-publishes-2013-standard-credit-support-annex-scsa/
[https://perma.cc/S38Z-VDQB].
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as the "Independent Amount" in most CSAs' 04 -can be expressed as a fixed
sum, an amount per transaction, or as a percentage of the notional amount. The
calculation of the Independent Amount can be based on a range of factors
including: the creditworthiness of the counterparties; the number, size, and
volatility of outstanding transactions, and the frequency of variation margin
calculations.'o In general, the larger and more risky a party's exposure to its
counterparty, the higher the Independent Amount it will demand as security
against counterparty credit risk. The terms governing the Independent Amount
will therefore be asymmetric, with the counterparty posing greater risks required
to post more collateral.' 06 Importantly, where the factors used to calculate the
Independent Amount change (e.g., where the creditworthiness of a counterparty
deteriorates), the terms of the CSA may envision corresponding changes to the
amount of collateral that counterparties are required to post.o7
The second category of collateral is variation margin. Under a CSA,
counterparties maintain a running account of posted collateral known as "Posted
Credit Support."' Variation margin is calculated by periodically comparing the
Posted Credit Support against the amount of collateral that each counterparty is
required to post pursuant to the terms of the CSA.1 09 This second amount is
known as the "Credit Support Amount."" 0 The Credit Support Amount is made
up of three components. The first is the "Exposure,""' typically defined as the
cost of replacing transactions that fall under the relevant Master Agreement.'12
In effect, the Exposure is designed to reflect the amount of collateral that would
be required to fully insulate a counterparty from losses in the event that the
relevant transactions were immediately closed out and any posted collateral
liquidated." 3 The second component consists of any Independent Amounts that
have been posted by the counterparties. Where a counterparty is required to post
variation margin, the Independent Amount is added to the Credit Support
104. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶ 13 (on file with author).
105. See FIRTH, supra note 16, § 12-6; Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral
Collateralization Practices, ISDA 43 (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.isda.org/a/iOiDE/collateral-market-
review.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH86-PTKR] [hereinafter Market Review].
106. Indeed, there is no point in requiring counterparties to post an Independent
Amount if these terms are not asymmetric, as the amount of collateral posted by both counterparties will
be identical and, therefore, offset. Where both counterparties are required to post an Independent Amount,
this collateral will be posted on a net basis by the counterparty required to post the larger of the two
amounts.
107. As described in Section III.C, CSA terms of this variety played an important role
in the downfall of AIG.
108. The Posted Collateral Support is also referred to in some CSAs as the "Credit
Support Balance." See, e.g., United Kingdom law CSA, ¶ 2 (on file with author).
109. See, e.g., New York law CSA, TT 3(a)-(b).
110. Id.
111. Id.T12.
112. Id.
113. See FIRTH, supra note 16, §§ 6-3-6-4, 12-3-12-4.
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Amount; where a counterparty is entitled to receive variation margin, the
Independent Amount is deducted from it. The third component is the
"Threshold."11 4 The Threshold represents the size of the residual uncollateralized
exposure, if any, that a counterparty is prepared to accept. Where a Threshold is
specified, a counterparty will only be required to post collateral where the other
counterparty's Exposure exceeds this Threshold."'
Variation margin calculations take place on a periodic basis in accordance
with the terms of each CSA. Each day on which this calculation takes place is
known as a "Valuation Date."1 6 While comprehensive market data is scarce,
ISDA has reported that the majority of CSAs envision daily variation margin
calculations, with a minority requiring weekly or monthly calculations."' Where
the Credit Support Amount exceeds a party's Posted Collateral Support on any
given Valuation Date, that party will be required to post collateral equal to the
difference." 8 Conversely, where the Credit Support Amount is less than the
Posted Collateral Support, the party will be entitled to a return of collateral from
its counterparty.11 9 Importantly, the obligation to deliver or return collateral does
not arise automatically: it must be demanded by the counterparty entitled to
receive the collateral.' 20 This demand is known as a margin or collateral "call."
Following receipt of a collateral call, most CSAs then contemplate that
counterparties will post collateral within two business days.' 2 ' Subject to the
application of the Threshold, variation margin requirements thus ensure that the
value of posted collateral is more or less continually adjusted to reflect any
changes in each counterparty's exposure.
Crucially, the value of the collateral posted under a CSA can fluctuate as a
result of market volatility.' 2 2 To compensate for these fluctuations, CSAs
typically provide that collateral can be valued at a percentage of its full market
value-the "Valuation Percentage"-for the purposes of calculating the Posted
114. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶ 13(E)(iv).
115. After adjusting for the Independent Amount. Id. ¶ 3. Counterparties can also agree
to "Minimum Transfer Amounts" that eliminate the obligation to post collateral where the variation
margin required in any given period falls below a specified amount. An important distinction between the
Threshold and any Minimum Transfer Amount is that, unlike the former, exceeding the latter obligates
the relevant counterparty to post the entire amount of required variation margin. Market Review, supra
note 105, at 44.
116. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶¶ 3, 12.
117. Market Review, supra note 105, at 44.
118. Known as the "Delivery Amount." See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶ 3(a).
119. Known as the "Return Amount." Id. ¶ 3(b).
120. This demand must be made promptly following the Valuation Date, although the
counterparties can elect to make this obligation automatic. See id. ¶¶ 3(a)-(b).
121. The New York law CSA, for example, contemplates that variation margin will be
posted the next local business day where the collateral call was made before 12 PM New York time, and
two local business days if the collateral call was made after this time. Id. ¶¶ 4(b), 12, 13(E)(c)(iv).
122. This is the case even for cash collateral, the value of which can fluctuate vis-d-vis
other currencies.
522
Split Derivatives
Collateral Support.'23 The difference between the collateral's market value and
this amount is known colloquially as a "haircut." The size of this haircut typically
reflects the expected volatility in the price of the relevant collateral asset. Thus,
for example, while counterparties will typically not impose haircuts on cash or
cash equivalents, they may impose significant haircuts on corporate bonds, long-
dated sovereign debt issued by foreign countries, and other risky securities.
Whereas initial and variation margin requirements are designed to protect a party
against the deterioration of its counterparty's creditworthiness, haircuts are thus
designed to provide a buffer against any deterioration in the market value of the
posted collateral.
The calculation of variation margin requirements is generally undertaken
by one of the counterparties typically the dealer known for the purposes of
the CSA as the "Valuation Agent." 2 4 The Valuation Agent's primary
responsibility is to calculate the Exposure.'25 This calculation necessitates that
the Valuation Agent determine the closeout (or replacement) value of the
transactions on the basis of prevailing market prices. 2 6 The Valuation Agent is
also responsible for calculating the value of any posted collateral, along with any
haircuts on this collateral in accordance with the specified Valuation
Percentage.1 27 The Valuation Agent must then notify the other counterparty of
its calculations, along with the resulting obligation to deliver or return collateral,
typically no later than the first business day following a Valuation Date.1 28
Finally, the ISDA Master Agreement includes a number of sophisticated
state-contingent terms governing what happens in the event that a counterparty
is unable to perform its contractual obligations. For these purposes, the ISDA
Master Agreement distinguishes between two types of events: "Termination
Events" and "Events of Default."1 29 Termination Events generally apply to
circumstances where the inability to perform is viewed as outside a party's
control.' 30 Termination Events specified in the Master Agreement include, for
example, illegal events stemming from changes in any applicable law, treaty,
rule, or regulation that make it unlawful for a party to perform its obligations
under a Master Agreement, trade confirmation, or CSA.131 They also include
"Force Majeure" events that render performance "impossible or
123. See New York law CSA, ¶¶ 12-13 (defining "Valuation Percentage," "Value," and
"Eligible Collateral").
124. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶¶ 12-13 (defining "Valuation Agent").
125. Id. ¶4(c).
126. Id. ¶ 12 (defining "Exposure").
127. Id. ¶ 4(c), 12 (defining "Value").
128. Id. ¶4(c).
129. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, §§ 5(a)-(b).
130. Although, technically speaking, the Termination Events in relation to tax and
credit events upon the merger of a party are within that party's control.
131. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, §§ 5(b)(i), 14 (defining "Law").
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impracticable."1 32 The processes for notifying a party of a Termination Event,
any applicable cure periods, and the methodology for calculating the amount due
upon termination vary depending upon the type of event and whether one or both
counterparties have been affected by it. In all cases, however, the occurrence of
a Termination Event will entitle an affected counterparty to closeout any
transactions that have been disrupted by the event.1 33
Events of Default, meanwhile, relate specifically to events or circumstances
that reflect a material increase in a party's exposure to counterparty credit risk.
Events of Default identified in the ISDA Master Agreement include: the failure
of a counterparty to make a payment or delivery,1 34 any breach of the other terms
of the Master Agreement,1 35 default under a CSA,1 36 cross-default under any
specified contracts,1 37 and the bankruptcy of a counterparty.13 8 The Master
Agreement then goes into considerable detail regarding what constitutes an
Event of Default under each of these headings. The bankruptcy Event of Default,
for example, expressly encompasses dissolution; cash flow insolvency; the
institution of a bankruptcy, insolvency, or equivalent process; a general
assignment, arrangement, or composition for the benefit of creditors; the passage
of a resolution in favor of winding-up, official management, or liquidation, or a
secured party taking possession of all or substantially all of a counterparty's
assets. 139
Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, the non-defaulting
counterparty is entitled to closeout all transactions under the relevant Master
Agreement.1 40 It can also simply withhold any payments or deliveries that would
otherwise fall due under the agreement.141 This latter entitlement gives the non-
defaulting counterparty an opportunity to explore the possibility of remedying
the Event of Default before closing out the transactions.1 42 Where the non-
defaulting counterparty ultimately elects to closeout transactions, it must
132. Id. § 5(b)(ii). The Master Agreement also includes a number of other, more
technical, Termination Events relating to changes in tax law and tax and credit events upon the merger of
a party to the agreement. Parties may also specify additional Termination Events at their discretion.
133. Id. § 6(b). In the case of Illegality Events of Default, both counterparties will be
entitled to closeout affected transactions regardless of whether they are an affected party. Id. §
6(b)(iv)(2)(A).
134. Id. § 5(a)(i).
135. Id. § 5(a)(ii)(1).
136. Id. § 5(a)(iii).
137. Id. §§ 5(a)(v)-(vi).
138. Id. § 5(a)(vii).
139. Id. For a detailed discussion of these events, see FIRTH, supra note 16, §§ 11-27-
11-48.
140. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 6(a). This is in contrast with
Termination Events, where only affected transactions can be closed out.
141. Id. § 2(a)(iii).
142. FIRTH, supra note 16, § 11-7 ("[Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement]
gives the parties a degree of breathing space to try to ensure that the Event of Default is remedied.").
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generally provide written notice to its counterparty.'4 3 The non-defaulting
counterparty will then typically be responsible for calculating the amount
known as the "Early Termination Amount" payable after the application of the
closeout netting process described in Part 1.144 When calculating the Early
Termination Amount, the non-defaulting counterparty will be required to act in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in accordance with a
methodology set out in the Master Agreement.1 45 This methodology envisions
that, where possible, the non-defaulting counterparty will calculate the
replacement cost of the relevant transactions on the basis of dealer quotes or
other market data.1 46
Over the course of the past thirty years, the basic legal architecture
supporting derivative contracts has thus become increasingly sophisticated and,
importantly, highly standardized. This standardization has been a key driver of
the growth of derivatives markets. It has also laid the foundations for their
increasing automation.
B. Increasing Automation
Between 1990 and 2005, the aggregate notional value of outstanding
derivatives contracting grew from approximately $3.45 trillion to almost $300
trillion.1 47 This dramatic growth was accompanied by a corresponding increase
in the administrative costs incurred by dealers over the lifecycle of a derivative
contract (see Figure 7). This lifecycle begins with the negotiation of the Master
Agreement, schedules, and any CSA by traders or other "front office" personnel.
Thereafter, each time the counterparties execute a trade confirmation, the
resulting transaction must go through the processes of clearing and settlement.
Clearing refers to the processes carried out by compliance and other "back
office" personnel in order to verify the terms of each trade confirmation,
periodically calculate amounts owing under a transaction, and reconcile any
differences in these terms or calculations as understood by the counterparties.1 48
Settlement then takes place on each occasion where the counterparties satisfy
143. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 6(a). The counterparties can also elect
for automatic early termination upon the occurrence of certain bankruptcy Events of Default. Id.
144. Id. § 6(e)(i). The Early Termination Amount is effectively determined by
calculating the replacement cost of the relevant transactions using market quotations, other market data,
or internal quotations (the "Closeout Amount") and then adding or subtracting, as necessary, certain other
amounts due as between the parties (the "Unpaid Amounts"). Id. §§ 6(e)(i), 14 (defining "Closeout
Amount" and "Unpaid Amounts").
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS 35 (Aug. 1996), http://www.bis.org/publ/r qt9608.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VND-BPEX]
(providing aggregate notional amounts for 1990); OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Halfof
2005, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS tbl. 1 (May 2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc hy06O5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T87G-ZHM4] (providing aggregate notional amounts for December 2005).
148. This is especially important where transactions are initially agreed by front office
personnel communicating via telephone.
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their payment or delivery obligations, post or return collateral, or close out a
transaction following a Termination Event or Event of Default.
Figure 7: The Lifecycle of a Derivative Contract
Negotiation Clearing Settlement
* Negotiating terms of Verifying terms of * Satisfaction of
master agreement, trade confirmations payment and/or
CSA, and schedules delivery obligations
Calculating amounts
* Negotiating terms of due under trade Exchange of initial or
each trade conformations, or in variation margin
confirmation accordance with under a CSA
initial or variation
margin requirements Payment of an Early
Termination Amount
Resolving disputes following a
over terms or Termination Event or
calculations Event of Default
Despite the rapid growth of derivatives markets, dealers were initially slow
to make investments in the back office infrastructure necessary to ensure the
timely negotiation, clearing, and settlement of derivative contracts. A
representative example from this period was the build-up of a significant backlog
in trade confirmations for many credit derivatives. Between 2002 and 2005,
trading volumes in credit derivatives more than doubled from an average of 644
transactions per week to over 1,400.149 As a result, by September 2005 the
fourteen largest credit derivatives dealers had collectively entered into over
150,000 unconfirmed transactions,150 with approximately 62% left unconfirmed
for more than 30 days and upwards of 41% unconfirmed for more than 90
days. 1 5  These delays were largely a product of the fact that dealers would
manually prepare a trade confirmation and then fax it to their counterparty, who
would in turn compare it against their own record of the transaction. 152 If
accurate, the counterparty would then fax the signed confirmation back to the
dealer.1 53 These manual clearing processes were extremely resource intensive
149. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-716, CREDIT DERIVATIVES:
CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS' OPERATIONAL RISKS, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY
ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION 11 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZXM6-C8RM].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Along with the practice of assigning trades to third parties without providing notice
to the originating dealer. Id. at 12-13.
153. Id.
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and, ultimately, lacked the scalability needed to respond to the rapid growth of
derivatives markets.1 54
The widespread use of manual clearing processes exposed derivatives
dealers to a number of operational risks. Paramount amongst them was that the
failure of dealers to confirm transactions and enter them into their information
management systems in a timely manner would make it impossible to accurately
measure and effectively manage both market and counterparty credit risk. 5 5 In
response, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and other regulators launched a joint regulatory initiative in
the fall of 2005 targeting the fourteen largest credit derivative dealers. The
primary thrust of this initiative was, in the short term, to persuade dealers to work
together to reduce the backlog of unconfirmed transactions and, over the longer
term, to address the underlying problem of underinvestment in back office
infrastructure.1 56 Amongst other matters, the dealers agreed to streamline their
clearing processes, promote the use of electronic clearing and settlement, and
coordinate in the development of a centralized trade depository. m By the end of
October 2006, these dealers had successfully reduced the number of credit
derivative transactions that remained unconfirmed after thirty days from 150,000
down to 5,500. 158 Four years later, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
observed with pride that of the over 900,000 derivative transactions on the books
of Lehman Brothers at the time of its collapse, only one transaction had been
subsequently challenged in the bankruptcy process on the basis of an
unconfirmed (or "open") trade.1 59
The resolution of the 2005 credit derivatives confirmation backlog marked
a turning point in the development of derivatives markets. Over the course of the
next decade, manual clearing processes were gradually replaced by electronic
clearing and settlement for many types of derivatives. By 2013, 98% of all credit
derivatives, 86% of interest rate derivatives, and 69% of currency derivatives
were confirmed electronically (see Figure 8).160 The shift toward electronic trade
154. Id.
155. The practice of assigning trades without notification also made it difficult for
dealers to understand exactly who their counterparties were and, thus, the nature and extent of their
exposure to counterparty credit risk. Where the failure to confirm trades meant that errors were left
undetected, this could also lead to potential legal disputes. Id. at 14-18; see also Stulz, supra note 10.
156. The UK Financial Services Authority was also involved in this initiative. U.S.
GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 149, at 18-19.
157. Id. at 20, 29-30.
158. Id. at 4.
159. See Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Theo Lubke, Policy Perspectives on OTC
Derivatives Market Infrastructure, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP. No. 424, at 2 (2010),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr424.html [https://perma.cc/J3F7-KBZY].
160. ISDA Operations Benchmarking Survey, supra note 68, at 8. Unfortunately, 2006
was the first year that ISDA began collecting this information, with the result that there is little
comprehensive empirical data against which to assess the impact of the 2005 credit derivatives backlog
(or trace the trend toward automation before this point in time).
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confirmations has in turn facilitated the automation of many other back office
processes: from transaction reconciliation and the calculation of payment and
delivery obligations, to the management of initial and variation margin, and
electronic settlement. In many cases, dealers and other counterparties now
outsource these processes to specialist trade processing platforms such as
MarkitSERV.16' These trade processing platforms aim to provide "straight
through processing": the complete automation of all clearing and settlement
events in the lifecycle of a derivative contract. These platforms also serve as
centralized depositories for derivatives trading information.
Figure 8: Percentage ofDerivatives Transactions Confirmed Electronically
-2006  0c~ 0G 2008 NO" 20 M 20
Source: ISDA Operations Benchmarking Surveys (2006-2013).
The ability to automate clearing and settlement is ultimately a function of
the state-contingent if x, then y structure of derivative contracts. If the
floating rate on an interest rate swap exceeds the fixed rate as of any given
Valuation Date, then the counterparty with a negative exposure to upward
movements in the floating rate will be required to pay the difference.1 62 If a
party's exposure under a total return equity swap increases beyond a given
Threshold, then its counterparty will be required to post additional variation
margin in accordance with the terms of the relevant CSA. Crucially, this
structure opens the door to capturing the key terms of derivative contracts in the
form of executable computer code. ISDA and other industry players have
161. MarkitSERV was originally a joint venture between Markit and the Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). Markit bought out DTCC's interest in MarkitSERV in 2013.
162. The "difference" in this example being the difference between the fixed and
floating rates multiplied by the notional amount (after adjusting for the frequency of settlement dates).
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capitalized on this opportunity through initiatives such as the development of
Financial products Markup Language (FpML). FpML is an open source XML-
based standard for electronic execution and processing of derivatives
transactions, enabling counterparties to capture the terms of transactions
electronically and communicate them to trade processing platforms such as
MarkitSERV.1 63 ISDA has also played a supporting role in the development of
unique trade, product, and legal entity identifiers designed to create a common
standard for derivatives transaction reporting. 16 These identifiers are the
equivalent of the universal product codes-i.e., barcodes used to track stock
levels at supermarkets and other retail establishments.1 65 These and other similar
initiatives form the technological backbone of the automated clearing and
settlement processes performed by dealers and trade processing platforms.
Together with the development of standardized contracts, the recent trend
toward automation has significantly reduced the costs of clearing and settlement.
It has also enhanced the scalability of derivatives markets: with the largest
derivatives dealers processing an average of 91,180 transaction lifecycle events
per month as of 2013.166 At the same time, the trend toward automation should
not be overstated. The negotiation of Master Agreements, schedules, and CSAs
can still take a considerable amount of time-in many cases weeks, if not
months. The trend has also been unevenly distributed across different types of
derivatives (see Figure 8), with many contracts still too complex to be captured
electronically and, thus, still subject to manual clearing and settlement processes.
Ultimately, however, the general direction of travel is clear: over the course of
the past three decades, derivatives markets have become larger, more
standardized, and increasingly automated.
C. The Shift Toward Central Clearing
Historically, the vast majority of derivative contracts have been cleared and
settled bilaterally: with the counterparties themselves responsible for processing
transaction lifecycle events.1 67 This bilateral clearing model poses a number of
potentially significant risks. First, the complexity of derivative contracts
163. For an overview of FpML, see FpML at a Glance, FPML,
http://www.fpml.org/about [https://perma.cc/UNL8-G2P8].
164. For an overview of these initiatives and ISDA's role in their development, see
Data & Reporting, ISDA, https://www.isda.org/category/infrastructure/data-reporting
[https://perma.cc/ZNC8-HAN8].
165. See Andy Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) "Building a Global Legal Entity
Identifier Framework" Symposium: Towards a Common Financial Language 2-3 (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.bis.org/review/rl20315g.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3TG-HBKQ].
166. ISDA Operations Benchmarking Survey, supra note 68, at 5.
167. Or outsourcing responsibility for processing these events to third-party trade
processing platforms.
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generates acute information problems, both at the level of individual contracts
and within the dense networks of interconnected contracts that collectively make
up derivatives markets.1 68  These information problems raise clear price
transparency and investor protection concerns.1 69 They also make it difficult for
both counterparties and regulators to effectively monitor the build-up of risk
within derivatives markets.' Second, as described in Part I, derivative contracts
are a form of debt. Like all debt, the leverage embedded within derivative
contracts can pose significant risks to both institutional and broader financial
stability.' 7 ' Finally, the mechanisms that counterparties use to manage
counterparty credit risk can exacerbate this instability. Perhaps most importantly,
initial and variation margin requirements sensitive to changes in a counterparty's
credit rating or market prices introduce the prospect of large and sudden
collateral calls at the precise moment when counterparties are facing potentially
severe liquidity or solvency constraints.1 72 By reducing the pool of assets
available to other creditors, these margin requirements-together with closeout
netting-can also undermine the liquidity and solvency of other firms.1 73
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policymakers in the United
States and elsewhere have introduced a number of regulatory reforms designed
to address the risks associated with the bilateral clearing model.1 74 The objective
of these reforms is to promote a shift away from bilateral and toward central
clearing of derivative contracts. Section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act, for example,
makes it unlawful for a counterparty to enter into any swap that meets certain
prescribed standardization, liquidity, and other requirements unless that swap
has been accepted for central clearing.175 Central clearing involves the transfer
168. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 43, at 470; see also Awrey, supra note 13.
169. ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 43, at 470.
170. Id.; Duffie, Li & Lubke, supra note 159.
171. For a discussion of one important dimension of the relationship between leverage
and financial instability, see Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, FED. RES. BANK
OF N.Y. STAFF REPORT NO. 328 (May 2008),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr328.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GMV9-UK96].
172. ARMOURET AL., supra note 43, at 471-472; see also Duffie, supra note 59; Roe,
supra note 11.
173. Roe, supra note 11. This problem is notably not resolved by central clearing. See
Richard Square, Clearinghouses andLiquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (2014).
174. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII; EMIR.
175. This requirement does not apply to commercial end-users entering into swaps for
the purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk. When determining whether a swap should be
subject to mandatory central clearing, the CFTC must take into account: the aggregate outstanding
notional value of the relevant species of swap; the level of market liquidity; the availability of pricing
data; the robustness of the infrastructure needed to clear the swap; the effect of central clearing on systemic
risk and competition, and the existence of reasonable legal certainty with regards to the treatment of
counterparty positions, funds, and property. Dodd-Frank Act § 723. The SEC has adopted similar rules
for swaps falling under its jurisdiction. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.C3a-1 (2018). In order to incentivize greater
utilization of central clearing, these reforms have been accompanied by the imposition of more onerous
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of derivative contracts from the original counterparties to an authorized
clearinghouse. The contractual rights and obligations of the counterparties vis-a-
vis each other are then replaced by two new mirrored contracts between the
clearinghouse and each of the two counterparties.
The potential benefits of central clearing flow principally from the
mechanisms that clearinghouses use to manage counterparty credit risk.'76 First,
clearinghouses utilize multilateral netting to eliminate offsetting exposures,
thereby reducing the overall number and size of payment obligations and, thus,
each party's exposure to counterparty default (see Figure 9).177 Second,
clearinghouses seek to minimize residual net exposures after multilateral netting
by requiring counterparties to post both initial and variation margin. In contrast
with the bilaterally clearing model, however where the relevant terms vary
from CSA to CSA the variation margin required by a clearinghouse is
calculated on a daily or even more frequent basis using the same methodology
across all derivative contracts of a particular type. 78 Where a counterparty
defaults on its obligations, the collateral posted pursuant to these requirements is
then used to compensate the clearinghouse for any losses. Third, clearinghouses
employ a number of loss sharing mechanisms designed to mutualize the residual
risks stemming from the default of one or more of its dealer (or "clearing")
members.1 79 These mechanisms include recourse to pre-committed default
funds, the clearinghouse's own capital, and contingent capital calls from
surviving clearing members. They also include "position portability" procedures
obligating surviving clearing members to assume the contractual rights and
obligations of defaulting clearing members. These mechanisms are collectively
referred to as a clearinghouse's "default waterfall."
capital and margin requirements on bilaterally cleared derivative contracts. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 45, 237, 349,
624, 1221 (2018); 17 C.F.R. §§ 23, 140 (2018).
176. ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 43, at 472-74 (describing the economic benefits of
central clearing). For a more detailed description of the mechanisms that clearinghouses use to address
counterparty credit risk, see Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting,
Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing ofDefault Risks Through a Central Counterparty (Jan. 8, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1340660.
[https://perma.cc/A6FK-DZ3S].
177. Clearinghouses also use a process known as "trade compression" to eliminate
redundant contracts, thereby reducing the number of contracts outstanding between two counterparties
without impacting their net positions.
178. See Pirrong, supra note 176, at 18-20 (describing the variation margin
methodologies employed by clearinghouses).
179. Id.
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Figure 9: Bilateral versus Multilateral Netting
$1
A *B A B
$4 $4
CCP
$2 $2
C .D C D
$2
Bilateral netting: 6 gross payments totaling $13
Multilateral netting: 4 net payments totaling $12
The push toward central clearing has been accompanied by regulatory
requirements designed to enhance the transparency of derivatives markets.
Section 727 of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates post-trade reporting of price,
volume, and other information for all swap contracts to a registered swaps data
repository (SDR). 80 These SDRs include trade processing platforms, along with
a number of depositories created by major clearinghouses. The information that
must be reported to an SDR at the time a transaction is executed includes: the
notional amount of the swap; its stated price; whether either party is a dealer,
major swap participant, or financial counterparty; whether the swap is
collateralized; the date and time it was executed; and its maturity, termination,
or end date.' Thereafter, a designated counterparty must also report any
changes to the primary economic terms of the swap over the life of the
contract.1 82 Section 727 also imposes an obligation on SDRs to ensure the real-
time public dissemination of certain anonymized transactional data: including
the notional amount of the swap; its stated price; the relevant underlying;
180. The basic requirement articulated in Section 727 is then supplemented by
regulatory rules prescribing in greater detail what information is to be reported. See Swap Data
Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 17 C.F.R. § 45 (2018) [hereinafter SDR Reporting Rule]. In
addition to these extensive post-trade reporting and disclosure requirements, Section 723 of the Dodd-
Frank Act also introduces a limited degree of pre-trade transparency. See Awrey, supra note 13, at 1158-
59.
181. SDR Reporting Rule, app. 1. SDR Reporting Rule, Section 45.8 provides a
hierarchy for the purposes of determining which counterparty is required to report the relevant
information. See WILLIAM MEEHAN & GABRIEL ROSENBERG, OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATION UNDER
DODD FRANK: A GUIDE TO REGISTRATION, REPORTING, BUSINESS CONDUCT AND CLEARING 72-75
(2015).
182. Id. at 75-76.
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whether the swap is bilaterally or centrally cleared; and whether it is
collateralized, along with its settlement currency, payment frequency, and
effective start and end dates.1 83
Ultimately, the shift toward central clearing and market transparency would
not be possible without the parallel trends toward contractual standardization and
automation. The ability of clearinghouses to effectively hedge the risks generated
by hundreds of thousands of mirrored derivative contracts requires the legal
architecture supporting these contracts to be highly standardized.'84
Standardization is also a necessary precondition to meaningful market
transparency. Specifically, where derivative contracts exhibit high levels of legal
heterogeneity, this will inevitably undermine the quality of the informational
signal sent by prices and, thus, the utility of publicly disseminating trade pricing
information.' Automation, in turn, is necessary to ensure that clearinghouses
can administer the enormous volume of transaction lifecycle events associated
with the clearing and settlement of derivative contracts. Automation is also
necessary to ensure that transaction information is provided to SDRs on a timely
basis, and that SDRs are able to disseminate trade pricing and other information
in real time. Viewed from this perspective, the push toward central clearing and
enhanced market transparency is likely to generate additional momentum toward
greater contractual standardization and automation, which will in turn enable
more derivative contracts to be cleared and settled through clearinghouses.
The past three decades have witnessed seismic changes in the size,
structure, and importance of derivatives markets. The most significant of these
changes include greater contractual standardization, increasing automation, and
the recent push toward central clearing. Taken together, these trends paint a
picture of increasing homogeneity, transparency, and liquidity and of the
incremental yet discernible commodification of derivatives markets.
Importantly, however, these trends only reflect how derivative contracts work
under "normal" market conditions: where markets are deep and liquid, where
prices are readily observable, and where contracting parties have no reason to
doubt the creditworthiness of their counterparties. They do not reflect how they
work during periods of fundamental uncertainty. How derivatives work in these
bad times is explored in the next Section.
183. See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 17 C.F.R. § 43 (2018)
[hereinafter the Real-Time Reporting Rule], app. A. This basic requirement is then supplemented by more
detailed rules prescribing what information SDRs are required to disseminate and in what manner, along
with a number of exemptions from the basic reporting requirement. Id.
184. See Awrey, supra note 13, at 1154-55 (describing legal and other forms of "basis"
risk that arise within derivatives markets).
185. Id. at 1124-38 (describing how legal heterogeneity undermines the informational
efficiency of derivatives markets).
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III. Derivatives in Bad Times
Given the sophistication of derivative contracts, one could be forgiven for
thinking that they are designed to explicitly cover every possible eventuality
from a minor inconsistency between an ISDA Master Agreement and trade
confirmation, to the sudden and unexpected bankruptcy of a counterparty. In
reality, however, even these highly detailed state-contingent contracts are
fundamentally incomplete. This incompleteness exposes counterparties to the
risk that their carefully designed contracts will fail to produce efficient outcomes.
It also exposes them to the threat of opportunistic behavior by their
counterparties over the life of the contract.
Contracting parties use a number of mechanisms to address these risks.
These mechanisms include "formal" strategies such as the allocation of property
or decision-making rights and the use of broad contractual standards. They also
include more "informal" mechanisms such as reputation and the expectation of
future dealings. These formal and informal mechanisms can work together with
the more detailed state-contingent terms of the ISDA Master Agreement,
schedule, and CSAs to provide counterparties with the flexibility to incorporate
new information, fill contractual gaps, and promote efficient ex post
renegotiation. More specifically, while state-contingent terms govern the
relationship of the counterparties under normal market conditions, these other
mechanisms can play an important role in shaping how counterparties behave
during periods of market disruption, institutional instability, and fundamental
uncertainty. To borrow a term coined by Ron Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert
Scott, this "braiding"' 8 6 of state-contingent contracting with other mechanisms
enables counterparties to make more credible commitments: incentivizing the
use of detailed state-contingent terms in good times by providing a mechanism
a safety valve for modifying or relaxing the strict application of these terms in
bad times.'
Section III.A identifies the sources of contractual incompleteness, the risks
it poses for contracting parties, and the formal and informal mechanisms that
parties can use to address these risks. Section III.B examines how these
mechanisms are bundled together with the more detailed state-contingent terms
186. See Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of
Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010)
(defining braiding as a governance tool) [hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding]; see also Ron Gilson et al.,
Contract, Uncertainty, and Innovation, in CONTRACT GOVERNANCE: DIMENSIONS IN LAW AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 155 (Stefan Grundmann, Florian Moslem & Karl Riesenhuber eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Gilson et al., Contract, Uncertainty, and Innovation]; Ronald Gilson, Engineering a Venture
Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003) (describing the
braiding of formal contract and informal reputation in the context of the U.S. venture capital market).
187. As Gilson, Sabel, and Scott explain, "the two techniques are complements when
each strategy reinforces the effectiveness of the other. Thus, an explicit contract that can cover most but
not all of the parties" obligations is complimented if the remaining obligations can be enforced informally
and the contract as a whole is workable." Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 186, at 1381.
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at the heart of derivative contracts. To help illuminate how these mechanisms
work, how they interact with one another, and their inherent limits, Section III.C
then examines a case study involving the renegotiation of a portfolio of credit
default swaps between Goldman Sachs and AIG at the height of the global
financial crisis.
A. Incomplete Contracting Under Conditions of Uncertainty
In theory, contracting parties can write state-contingent contracts that
specify their rights and obligations in each and every potential future state of the
world." In practice, however, the vast majority of real world contracts fall far
short of this standard of perfect "completeness."' 89 The pervasiveness of
incomplete contracting can be attributed to a number of different factors. As a
preliminary matter, contracting parties face the potentially significantfront-end
costs of designing, drafting, and negotiating ostensibly complete contracts.1 90
Writing these contracts demands that parties identify each potential future state
of the world, calculate the probability that each state will materialize, understand
the position and payoffs of each party in each state and, ultimately, use this
information to structure the most efficient bundle of rights and obligations in
connection with each possible eventuality.191 Thereafter, parties also face the
back-end costs of monitoring compliance with these contracts, along with the
costs of verifying to a court, arbitrator, or other third-party referee that a given
188. For an overview of the theoretical literature examining (in)complete contracts, see
PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWTRAPOINT, CONTRACT THEORY chs. 11-12 (2004). The field of
incomplete contracting was pioneered by economists Oliver Hart & John Moore. See Oliver Hart,
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1988); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999) [hereinafter Hart &
Moore, Foundations]; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988) [hereinafter Hart & Moore, Renegotiation].
189. The concepts of "completeness" and "incompleteness" are sometimes used in
different ways in the literature. See Hart & Moore, Foundations, supra note 188, at 134. "Obligationally
incomplete" contracts fail to fully specify the rights and obligations of the parties in one or more potential
future states. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). "Insufficiently state-contingent contracts," in contrast, are
incomplete due to high front- or back-end transaction costs. Id. For the present purposes, nothing hinges
on this distinction and the term "incomplete" contract is used to encompass both types of incompleteness
identified by Ayres and Gertner.
190. Numerous scholars have identified these front-end contracting costs as a barrier to
(complete) contracting. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 385 (1937);
Kathryn Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. OF ECON. 432 (1992); Oliver
Williamson, Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233 (1979); see also Hart, supra note 188; Hart & Moore, Foundations, supra note 188; Hart & Moore,
Renegotiation, supra note 188.
191. See, e.g., Robert Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 823 (2006); see also Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles ofRelational
Contracts. 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
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state of the world has, in fact, materialized.' 92 Where these costs exceed the
expected benefits of writing a complete contract, we would expect parties to
resort to incomplete contracting as a second-best strategy.
In addition to the high costs of writing, monitoring, and enforcing complete
state-contingent contracts, parties may also face more fundamental uncertainty
about the future. Whereas risk relates to future states of the world that can be
identified and estimated probabilistically, uncertainty in this context refers to the
inability to describe a state with sufficient precision or assign a probability to the
prospect that this state will materialize.1 93 While risk can theoretically be
identified, parameterized, and allocated for the purposes of designing state-
contingent contracts, uncertainty is thus incapable of being addressed through
this type of detailed ex ante contracting.' 94 The paradigmatic example of
uncertainty involves estimating the probability at a given point in time (to) that a
specific event e.g., the invention of the wheel will occur in some future
period (ti). It is simply not possible to write a state-contingent contract at to
conditional on the invention of the wheel at ti: to have written such a contract is
to have satisfied the very condition upon which the contract is premised! Where
it exists, this type of fundamental uncertainty will therefore represent an
insurmountable barrier to writing complete state-contingent contracts. 95
Finally, the ability of parties to write complete state-contingent contracts
may be constrained by bounded rationality and cognitive failure.1 96 The concept
of bounded rationality encompasses cognitive and temporal limits on a party's
ability to absorb and process information.' 97 The sources and types of bounded
rationality have in recent years been the subject of a rich and growing body of
empirical literature documenting systematic failures in human judgment and
192. For a more detailed description of the back-end costs of verifying contracts, see
Scott & Triantis, supra note 191, at 825-834.
193. This distinction was first advanced by Frank Knight. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
194. Gilson et al., Contract, Uncertainty, and Innovation, supra note 186, at 4.
195. In reality, of course, contracting parties will often face a mix of high front- and
back-end costs and fundamental uncertainty thus making the distinction between risk and uncertainty
difficult to disentangle as a practical matter. This distinction will be particularly hard to make out where
transaction costs are extremely high, where the probability that a given state of the world will materialize
is extremely low, or where contracting parties attempt to contract into the distant future. Accordingly, the
term "fundamental uncertainty" as used in this Article encompasses both (i) true (i.e.., "Knightian")
uncertainty and (ii) circumstances in which high transaction costs and other factors effectively prevent
complete ex ante contracting.
196. Robert Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 2005, 2010 (1987) [hereinafter Scott, Conflict and Cooperation]; Robert Scott, Error and
Rationality in IndividualDecision-Making: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and
the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 332-47 (1986).
197. Bounded rationality is a semi-strong form of rationality pursuant to which
economic actors are assumed to be "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so." OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 11 (1985) (quoting HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR xxiv (1957)).
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decision-making.' 98 These failures include framing effects (the tendency to be
influenced by how information is presented), availability bias (the tendency to
be influenced by the most immediate or proximate examples), anchoring (the
tendency to be influenced by the first information presented), and loss aversion
(the tendency to prefer the avoidance of losses to the receipt of equivalent
gains).' 99 These cognitive failures can impose severe constraints on the ability of
contracting parties to identify potential future states of the world, to accurately
assess the probability that they will occur and, ultimately, to write the detailed
state-contingent contracts necessary to efficiently allocate risk in each potential
state.200
Incomplete contracts expose parties to two principal risks. The first risk is
that these contracts will fail to prescribe an efficient allocation of rights and
obligations in some future states of the world. Thus, for example, a contract
could fail to identify the rights and obligations of the parties in one or more states,
or allocate rights and obligations in a way that generated suboptimal payoffs.
The second risk is that a party will take advantage of this incompleteness to
behave opportunistically. Where an incomplete contract is revealed to be ex post
inefficient, the parties should possess powerful incentives to renegotiate it.20 1
However, where the relationship is characterized by an asymmetry of bargaining
power, the more powerful party may seek to use this renegotiation to extract the
entire value of the resulting efficiency gains.202 This threat of opportunism or
"hold-up" will be particularly accurate where only one party has made
relationship or asset-specific investments, or where the contract contemplates the
sequential performance of obligations.203 Where this threat exists, the effect will
198. For a survey of this literature, see Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey
ofBehavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE (George Constantinides, Milton
Harris & Rene Stulz, eds., 2003). See also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
199. For a more detailed description of each of these and other cognitive failures, see
KAHNEMAN, supra note 198.
200. For some of the recent legal scholarship examining these failures in a contractual
setting, see David Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 CHI.
L. REV. 395 (2013); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences ofDisclosing Standard Terms,
103 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017).
201. See Ron Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration 27 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No.
118, 2008) (describing how renegotiation can ensure both ex ante and ex post efficiency in the face of
uncertainty); Hart & Moore, Foundations, supra note 188, at 115 (identifying the costs of ex ante
contracting and describing how the renegotiation of incomplete contracts can give parties an opportunity
to revisit the contract in light of realized states of the world); Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra note
196, at 2008 (characterizing incomplete contracts as containing an implicit agreement to renegotiate the
contract in response to future developments).
202. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 201, at 27-28.
203. See Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Oliver
Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1983); Williamson, supra note 42.
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be to discourage parties from writing detailed state-contingent contracts in the
presence of high levels of risk or uncertainty about the future.
Economic theorists have identified a variety of formal and informal
mechanisms that contracting parties can employ to address these risks. The
formal mechanisms fall into three broad categories.204 The first mechanism
involves the allocation of property rights to the party vulnerable to
opportunism.20 In effect, the residual control rights associated with property
ownership enable parties to take unilateral action upon the occurrence of
specified contingencies thereby protecting these parties against the risk of
hold-up and other forms of opportunism.20 6 The principal benefit of this
mechanism is thus its inherently self-executing nature: the party can simply
exercise its residual control rights instead of having to seek enforcement via
more formal legal mechanisms.20 7 This is especially useful where ex ante
relationship or asset-specific investments are costly to specify or observe, but
where materialized states of the world are easily and objectively observable.208
The second involves the allocation of decision-making rights.20 9 For
example, contracting parties can agree that, in the event that a contract was
revealed to be incomplete in some material respect, one party would have the
right to determine the most efficient course of action. Like property rights, the
principal benefit of this mechanism thus stems from the fact that the party
allocated these decision-making rights can take unilateral action. By specifying
who has authority to make decisions in a given state of the world but not
specifying particular courses of action this mechanism also gives parties the
flexibility to incorporate new information into the decision-making process.
Simultaneously, of course, the benefits of this mechanism hinge on how easy it
is to identify which party is likely to be the most vulnerable to opportunism.210
204. Theoretically, parties can also specify ex ante a desired outcome and then bargain
over how best to achieve that outcome in light of the realized state of the world. See Jean Tirole & Eric
Maskin, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999).
Ultimately, however, this strategy is likely to be extremely costly. Hart & Moore, Foundations, supra
note 188, at 118. Where realized states of the world are costly to observe, this strategy may also give rise
to opportunism.
205. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs andBenefits ofOwnership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). In theory, the parties can also allocate
these rights to independent third parties.
206. Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 188, at 499; Grossman & Hart, supra note 205.
Notably, Grossman and Hart's view of property as representing residual control rights contrasts with
earlier views of property as representing residual cash flow rights. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory
ofthe Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
207. Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 188, at 506.
208. Id. at 504-505. Where these states of the world are not easily observable, however,
this mechanism poses the risk of "contrived expropriation": i.e., that the party will exploit this lack of
observability to opportunistically exercise its residual control rights. Williamson, supra note 203.
209. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 201, at 29-30; Ian Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 868-69 (1978).
210. Id. at 28.
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Even where this is unclear, however, the parties can still ameliorate the attendant
risks by allocating decision-making rights to independent third parties.
The third formal mechanism for addressing the risks posed by incomplete
contracting involves the use of broad contractual standards to demarcate the
acceptable range of behavior. Examples of these standards include contractual
terms requiring parties to use their "best efforts," obligating them to act in "good
faith" or in a "commercially reasonable" manner, or imposing fiduciary duties.2 1 '
These standards provide a benchmark against which courts, arbitrators, and other
third parties can evaluate the conduct of the parties in light of realized states of
the world. The benefits of standards-based contracting thus stem from the fact
that these third parties will be armed with information that the parties themselves
did not possess at the time of contracting.212 By the same token, relying on third
parties to evaluate the behavior of contracting parties on the basis of broad
standards necessitates that this behavior is both easily observable and, crucially,
verifiable.213 Where this behavior is not susceptible to verification, contracting
parties will face a heightened risk that the adjudicator will fail to properly apply
the relevant standard.
The risks posed by incomplete contracting can also be addressed through a
variety of more informal mechanisms. These mechanisms include ethical norms,
culture, religion, personal relationships, and prevailing industry practices. 214
Two important mechanisms in the context of many commercial relationships are
reputation and the expectation of future dealings.215 The expectation of future
dealings reflects the willingness of Party A to continue to do business with Party
B in light of Party B's behavior over the course of their relationship. Where Party
211. See Macneil, supra note 209, at 866-68; Scott & Triantis, supra note 191; see also
Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Contracts andFiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Oliver
Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299 (1993); Mariana Pargendler,
Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties Reconsidered, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1315 (2008).
212. See Ron Gilson, Charles Sabel, & Robert Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 57 (2014).
213. Whereas "observability" refers to the ability of contracting parties to observe a
given action or state of the world, "verifiability" refers to the ability of third parties to verify these actions
or states.
214. There is a large body of scholarship examining how these mechanisms work in
various contexts. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBOURS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1994); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law]; Avner
Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders'
Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Rene
Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business Implications, 104 BANKING L.J. 313
(1987).
215. See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (describing both the potential role and
limits of reputation as a mechanism for incentivizing contractual performance).
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B behaves cooperatively (or opportunistically), this is likely to have a positive
(negative) impact on Party A's willingness to deal with Party B going forward.
Reputation, meanwhile, reflects the willingness of other market participants to
do business with Party B in light of its observed behavior towards Party A.216
Viewed from this perspective, both reputation and the expectation of future
dealings rely on the same fundamental threat the loss of future revenue-to
constrain opportunism and promote efficient renegotiation of incomplete
contracts.2 17 The repeat interactions upon which these mechanisms are based can
also be viewed as creating a reserve of goodwill that can be tapped for the
purposes of resolving contractual disputes. 218 As with property and decision-
making rights, the sanctions associated with these informal mechanisms are
essentially self-executing: in response to opportunistic behavior a party can
adopt a less cooperative posture or simply stop doing business with its
counterparty.2 9
The ability of reputation and the expectation of future dealings to constrain
opportunistic behavior are subject to important limits. First, where the expected
benefits of opportunistic behavior exceed the expected loss of future revenue,
these mechanisms will not serve as an effective deterrent. Along the same vein,
these mechanisms are unlikely to constrain opportunistic behavior where a party
believes its counterparty is in the vicinity of insolvency, or where its own
survival is threatened. Second, the influence of these mechanisms is likely to be
muted in the absence of meaningful competition. Specifically, as the number of
substitutes for a good or service decreases, so too does the credibility of a party's
threat to stop doing business with a party supplying these goods and services.
Finally, in order for these mechanisms to provide a credible constraint against
opportunism, the behavior in question must be easily and objectively observable:
either by the party vulnerable to opportunism (in the case of the expectation of
future dealings) or by the wider community or marketplace (in the case of
reputation). 220 For this reason, it is often argued that reputational constraints are
most effective in the context of small, close-knit, and homogeneous
communities.221
216. Viewed from this perspective, the key reputational concern is whether the relevant
party can be trusted to behave cooperatively, and not opportunistically, in the context of matters that are
subject to incomplete contracting.
217. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 546 (2003); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 14 (1963).
218. Macaulay, supra note 217, at 15.
219. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 217, at 557.
220. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 214; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law,
supra note 214; Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 186, at 1394; Scott, Conflict and Cooperation, supra
note 196.
221. See ELLICKSON, supra note 214; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 214; Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law, supra note 214; Greif, supra note 214; Landa, supra note 214. As Lisa
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Along with more formal mechanisms for addressing the risks posed by
incomplete contracting, reputation and the expectation of future dealings can
thus help contracting parties incorporate new information, fill contractual gaps,
and facilitate efficient ex post renegotiation. When braided with detailed state-
contingent contracting, the flexibility associated with these mechanisms can
thereby promote long-term contracting under conditions where the combination
of high levels of risk and uncertainty might otherwise prevent the parties from
contracting at all.222 Furthermore, the self-executing nature of many of these
mechanisms will almost invariably be less costly than seeking formal legal
enforcement of state-contingent contracts through the courts. 2 3 As Gilson,
Sabel, and Scott observe, this helps explain why parties will often rely on
informal mechanisms even where formal remedies for breach of contract are
available.224 Conversely, where these informal mechanisms break down,
contracting parties will have little recourse other than formal contractual
enforcement.225
B. Bundling State-Contingent Contracting with Other Formal Mechanisms
The counterparties to derivative contracts face a myriad of potentially
significant risks. These risks include both market and counterparty credit risk,
along with liquidity risk,226 operational risk,227 and the legal and economic basis
risks associated with managing a portfolio of derivative contracts.22 8 In many
cases, the identification, evaluation, and management of these risks can be
extremely costly.229 Counterparties also face significant uncertainty about the
Bernstein has observed in the context of the U.S. cotton industry, these constraints can also be effective
where market participants are connected through an influential industry trade association. Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law, supra note 214.
222. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 186.
223. Where time, attorneys' fees, court courts, and the risk ofjudicial error all generate
potentially significant costs. Id.
224. Id. (citing Macaulay, supra note 217).
225. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 217, at 546. The incentives to pursue formal
enforcement will be especially powerful where the innocent party has made significant asset or
relationship-specific investments, or where its counterparty's failure to perform its obligations threatens
the party's very survival.
226. "Liquidity risk" in this context refers to the risk that a counterparty will not be able
to enter into an offsetting or replacement contract on a timely basis and at a price that reflects the
underlying economics of the transaction. See Brunnermeier & Pedersen, supra note 61.
227. "Operational risk" in this context refers to the risk that a counterparty will fail to
implement robust processes, systems, and controls to measure, monitor, and manage the risks associated
with derivative contracts.
228. "Basis risk" in this context refers to the risk that two theoretically offsetting
derivative contracts actually differ in some material way as a result of differences in their legal and/or
economic terms. See Awrey, supra note 13, at 1155.
229. See Morgan, supra note 42 (documenting unusual splits in the credit ratings of
large financial institutions); see also Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison & Joel Shapiro, Corporate
Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial Crisis?. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.
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future (e.g., about how markets and institutions will evolve over time, and the
sources, timing, and potential impact of financial instability). This risk and
uncertainty can crystalize in millions of different ways, thus theoretically
requiring contracting parties to identify and evaluate the payoffs under millions
of different potential outcomes. Writing detailed state-contingent contracts that
exhaustively cover these outcomes would be prohibitively costly, thus exposing
counterparties to the risks of both ex post inefficiency and potential
opportunism.230
Given the inevitability of incomplete contracting, it should come as no
surprise that counterparties use a range of formal and informal mechanisms in
order to enhance the credibility of their commitments. The first mechanism is the
allocation of property rights in the form of collateral.2 3' As described in Part II.A,
counterparties will often be required to post initial margin the Independent
Amount under a CSA at the outset of a transaction. Thereafter, counterparties
will periodically adjust the amount of Posted Credit Support in accordance with
applicable variation margin requirements. Upon the occurrence of specified
Termination Events or Events of Default, the collateral taker can then seize and
liquidate posted collateral rather than having to incur the time and expense of
pursuing formal legal enforcement.2 32 By requiring parties to post collateral
against residual net exposures, these initial and variation margin requirements
can thus help protect counterparties against the risks generated by any
unexpected change in circumstances, or in the event that a counterparty defaults
on its contractual obligations.
The allocation of property rights can also play two important and
complimentary roles in protecting vulnerable counterparties against the threat of
opportunism. First, insofar as it can be used as a substitute for relationship-
specific investments in ex ante screening and ex post monitoring of counterparty
creditworthiness, collateral can help ameliorate potential hold-up problems.23 3
STAFF REP. No. 502 (June 1, 2011),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr502.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S93B-2F3U].
230. As described above, the idiosyncratic nature of counterparty credit risk means that
these investments will be largely non-recoverable, thus giving rise to potential hold-up problems. See Part
I. These risks will be particularly acute where parties have made significant relationship-specific
investments by, for example, rigorously screening and monitoring the creditworthiness of their
counterparties.
231. Several scholars have identified the provision of collateral, along with the related
concept of "hostages," as a governance mechanism. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and the
State ofNature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 15-16 (1985); Williamson, supra note 203.
232. Viewed from this perspective, the safe harbors for derivatives under corporate
bankruptcy law can be understood as designed to ensure that this mechanism is self-executing in
circumstances where the application of an automatic stay or fraudulent transfer rules would otherwise
prohibit unilateral enforcement (especially under security interest systems, where counterparties would
not otherwise enjoy residual control rights over collateral assets).
233. Williamson, supra note 203; see also Holmstrom, supra note 49, at 6; Awrey,
supra note 13, at 1150-51.
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Second, where a party has posted collateral, the threat that its counterparty might
withhold it in response to any opportunistic behavior can serve as a powerful
"hostage" or deterrent. 34
The second mechanism that counterparties use to address the risks posed
by incomplete contracting is the allocation of decision-making rights. An
illustrative example is the appointment of a Valuation Agent. As described in
Section II.A, the Valuation Agent is the counterparty responsible for calculating
the Exposure for the purposes of calculating variation margin requirements, the
value of posted collateral, and any Early Termination Amount due upon the
occurrence of a Termination Event or Event of Default.23 5 The appointment of a
Valuation Agent reflects the fact that variation margin requirements and closeout
netting rely on input variables that can only be determined after the parties have
entered into the contract. Where these variables are based on observable market
prices, the role of the Valuation Agent is essentially administrative: simply
identifying the relevant market prices and inputting them into the formulas set
out in the ISDA Master Agreement and CSA. However, where assets are thinly
traded, where the underlying markets are opaque or have broken down, or where
the underlying is not actually traded in a market, the Valuation Agent will often
enjoy considerable discretion over the methodologies for calculating these input
variables.236 These methodologies include so-called "mark-to-model"
approaches to valuation that seek to price assets on the basis of theory-driven
financial models as opposed to prevailing market prices. The Valuation Agent
mechanism thus not only enables counterparties to incorporate information that
will only be revealed over the life of a derivative contract, but also ensures that
the variation margin and closeout netting mechanisms at the heart of these
contracts will continue to function even when this information is not available.
Importantly, where market prices or other input variables are not easily
observable, the allocation of decision-making rights to a Valuation Agent will
leave the other counterparty vulnerable to opportunism. Specifically, the
Valuation Agent may exploit this lack of observability to calculate variation
margin requirements or collateral values in ways that shift the economics of the
transaction in its favor. Derivative contracts employ several mechanisms to
address this vulnerability. The first is a dispute resolution mechanism. Where a
dispute arises in connection with the calculation of variation margin
234. As Anthony Kronman has observed, there is a subtle difference between
"collateral" and a "hostage." Whereas collateral is designed to confer a benefit on the collateral taker, a
hostage is designed to impose a cost on the collateral provider. Kronman, supra note 231, at 15-16. In the
context of derivative markets, the fact that the relevant assets are typically valuable to both the collateral
taker and collateral provider means that this mechanism performs both an insurance (collateral) and
deterrent (hostage) function.
235. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶ 4(c). The Valuation Agent is also responsible for
calculating distributions and interest on posted collateral. Id. ¶ 6(d).
236. Id. ¶ 5(i)(B).
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requirements, for example, the Valuation Agent is generally required to obtain
quotes for replacement transactions from several dealers. 3 7 The Valuation Agent
must then use the arithmetic average of these quotes to calculate the applicable
margin requirements.238 Where disputes relate to the value of posted collateral,
meanwhile, the Valuation Agent is required to use the prevailing bid price of the
securities on the exchange on which they are listed or, where they are listed on
an exchange, obtain a dealer quote.239
Where market prices or quotations are not readily available, the Valuation
Agent will continue to enjoy residual discretion over the methodology for
calculating both variation margin requirements and the value of posted
collateral. 24 0 To help constrain the risk of opportunism associated with this
discretion, CSAs then employ standards-based contracting: requiring the
Valuation Agent to undertake calculations "in accordance with standard market
practice." 24 1 This standard is supplemented by the imposition of a general duty
on both counterparties to perform their obligations under the CSA including
all calculations, valuations, and determinations "in good faith" 242 and "in a
commercially reasonable manner." 243 Finally, where a Valuation Agent defaults
on its obligations under a derivative contract, CSAs typically shift responsibility
for performing closeout netting calculations to a third party designated by the
non-defaulting counterparty.244 This reallocation of decision-making rights is
designed to protect the non-defaulting counterparty from the risk that the
defaulting counterparty will use their position as Valuation Agent to manipulate
the value of the Early Termination Amount or the timing of the calculation and
payment process.
The Valuation Agent mechanism is not the only example of standards-
based contracting within ISDA's contractual architecture.245 In addition to the
detailed state-contingent terms governing each counterparty's settlement
obligations, the ISDA Master Agreement provides that all payments and
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. ¶ 13(l)(ii). Where no bid price (quote) is available on a Valuation Date, the
Valuation Agent can use the bid price (quote) "for the day next preceding such date on which such prices
were available." Id.
240. Id. ¶ 5(d)(i)(B) ("[I]f no quotations are available for a particular Transaction [or
Swap Transaction], then the Valuation Agent's original calculations will be used for that Transaction [or
Swap Transaction]").
241. Id. 13(c)(i).
242. Id.¶11(d).
243. Id.
244. Id. ¶ 13(c)(i). This third party must be a financial institution that would qualify as
a market-making dealer. Id.
245. In addition to the examples described below, the ISDA Master Agreement employs
standards-based contracting in a number of other contexts. See, e.g., ISDA ,Master Agreement, supra note
86, at § 6(d)(i) (requiring counterparties to undertake calculations upon any early termination as soon as
"reasonably practicable"); id. § 6(f) (requiring counterparties to act in "good faith" and use "commercially
reasonable" procedures when undertaking currency conversions).
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deliveries must be made "in the manner customary" for the relevant payment or
delivery obligation.246 Counterparties must also exercise "reasonable care" to
ensure the safe custody of posted collateral.247 The use of broad standards in this
context injects a degree of flexibility into each counterparty's obligations. This
reflects both the existence of a wide variety of different settlement and custody
models across derivative contracts, underlying assets, and jurisdictions and,
importantly, the need to keep up with the rapid pace of technological change in
the area of payment, custody, and settlement systems. 248 The ISDA Master
Agreement similarly requires counterparties to use "all reasonable efforts" to
maintain any government authorizations and consents necessary to enter into
derivative contracts, and to obtain any authorizations and consents that may
become necessary in the future.249 Once again, the flexibility associated with this
standard is advantageous in a world where regulation is both voluminous and
constantly changing and where, accordingly, the use of more detailed or
prescriptive terms to codify these obligations would be highly impractical.
C. The Role ofReputation and the Expectation ofFuture Dealings
Collateral, Valuation Agents, and standards-based contracting each fill
important gaps in the sophisticated state-contingent terms at the heart of
derivative contracts. Yet these formal mechanisms for addressing the risks posed
by incomplete contracting are themselves far from perfect. Collateral is
expensive. The valuation of many financial assets is a notoriously complex and
subjective process. Going to a court or arbitrator to enforce broad contractual
standards can be extremely costly and unpredictable. These imperfections carve
out a potentially significant role for informal mechanisms such as reputation and
the expectation of future dealings. In theory, the idea that the behavior of
commercial parties could be influenced by their desire to maximize potential
future revenue streams is hardly contentious. As Stewart Macaulay wryly
observed in his ground-breaking 1963 study of the importance of informal
mechanisms in business relationships: "Suing a customer who is not bankrupt
and might order again is poor strategy." 250 In practice, however, it is often
difficult to measure the impact of these mechanisms in the real world.25' Indeed,
we might expect this to be particularly difficult within derivatives markets,
246. Id. § 2(a)(ii).
247. See, e.g., New York law CSA, ¶ 6(a).
248. For an overview of the technological change in this area, see ARMOUR ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 391-408.
249. ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 86, § 4(b).
250. Macaulay, supra note 217, at 17.
251. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New
Thoughts, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 182, 183 (2007); Michael Whinston, On the Transaction Cost
Determinants of Vertical Integration, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2003) (both acknowledging that
idiosyncratic relationship-specific investments are often difficult to measure empirically).
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where the negotiation-and renegotiation-of contracts takes place almost
entirely behind closed doors. Thankfully, the global financial crisis has provided
us with a window into the dynamics of the renegotiation process under
conditions of fundamental uncertainty. This window involved the renegotiation
of a portfolio of credit default swap (CDS) contracts between AIG and Goldman
Sachs.
The rise and fall of global insurance giant AIG has been well
documented.252 Before its spectacular collapse in September 2008, AIG was an
important player in the global CDS market, underwriting billions of dollars in
credit protection on corporate debt, regulatory capital, and multisector
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).253 The counterparties to these swap
contracts included major derivative dealers including Bank of America,
Deutsche Bank, Soci6t6 General, and Goldman Sachs.254 As of September 2008,
approximately 77% of the CDOs in AIG's multi-sector CDO book totaling
roughly $55 billion-contained securities linked to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage
market.2 55 As conditions in this market deteriorated between 2005 and 2007, the
resulting decline in both the market prices and credit ratings of the CDOs in
AIG's portfolio triggered collateral calls under the CSAs it had entered into
alongside the relevant swap contracts.256 Eventually, the markets for these CDOs
and many of the underlying assets would break down completely thus leaving
counterparties with no observable market price against which to mark their
exposures or calculate variation margin requirements. As the mark-to-market
losses on these contracts mounted,257 AIG suffered a series of downgrades to its
own credit rating, thus triggering further collateral calls.258 These collateral calls
slowly but steadily drained AIG's cash holdings, subjecting it to a death by a
thousand cuts. It was against this backdrop that an illuminating renegotiation
between AIG and its counterparty Goldman Sachs unfolded.
Of course, one might question how far we can really apply the insights from
this one case study to our more general understanding how derivative contracts
work. AIG and Goldman Sachs are two of the world's largest and most
sophisticated financial institutions. At the time of the renegotiation, the
252. See, e.g., The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Governments Exit
Strategy, CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL (June 20, 2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9U-HDDK] [hereinafter The AIG
Rescue]; RODDY BOYD, FATAL RISK: A CAUTIONARY TALE OF AIG'S CORPORATE SUICIDE (2011);
William Sjostrum, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009); Richard Squire, Shareholder
Opportunism in a World ofRisky Debt, 123 HARV.L.REV. 1151 (2010).
253. See The AIG Rescue, supra note 252, at 18-36.
254. Id. at 72 (identifying the derivative counterparties of AIG that ultimately received
payouts from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
255. Id. at 24.
256. Id. at 28-31.
257. Along with the losses on its related securities lending portfolio. See Squire, supra
note 252.
258. Id.
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outstanding value of their derivative contracts with each other measured in the
billions of dollars. This renegotiation also took place in the midst of the largest
financial crisis since the Great Depression. There are many reasons why this case
study stands out as a potential exception, rather than as a generally applicable
rule. Yet this is precisely the point: how derivatives work in bad times will
inevitably depend on the identity of the counterparties, the strength of their
relationships, the size of their outstanding exposures, and the exigencies of the
crisis.
Goldman Sachs and AIG share a long history. In the 1990s, it was reported
that then Goldman CEO Jon Corzine and AIG Chairman Hank Greenberg briefly
flirted with the idea of a merger between the two venerable Wall Street firms.25 9
Over the years, Goldman and AIG had also worked together on a number of
significant transactions.260 Yet despite this longstanding and mutually profitable
relationship, Goldman was the first counterparty to demand more collateral from
AIG in response to the deterioration of the sub-prime mortgage market. On July
27, 2007, Goldman issued its first collateral call, demanding that AIG post over
$1.8 billion in collateral.26 ' Goldman would issue additional collateral calls in
November 2007, and in January and March 2008.262 Many of the valuations
underpinning these collateral calls were based on actual market prices.263 As
market conditions deteriorated, however, Goldman was sometimes forced to use
price changes in relation to broadly comparable assets, the movement of
financial indices such as the ABX, and Goldman's own internal models as the
259. WILLIAM COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: How GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE
THE WORLD 383 (2011).
260. For example, AIG and Goldman had worked together in 2003 to provide insurance
on asset-backed securities issued by the private operators of two airports in Rome. John Carney, Here's
the Untold Story of How AIG Destroyed Itself, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-the-untold-story-of-how-aig-destroyed-itself-2010-3?IR=T
[https://perma.cc/HVZ2-867N].
261. See Collateral Invoice from Goldman Sachs International to AIG Financial
Products Corp (July 27, 2007), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2007-07-
27 Goldman Sachs-Collateral Invoice to AIG.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DT8-RGNW]. The relevant CSA
included a threshold of $75,000,000 and contemplated that AIG would post collateral against exposures
where the price of the underlying CDOs decreased by more than 4%. See Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) Staff Memorandum, at 4-5 (Sept. 17, 2010), http:/fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2010-09-
17_FCICStaffMemoreGoldmanSachsExposureto AIG.pdf[https://perma.cc/3LGH-PYUC].
262. See Collateral Invoices from Goldman Sachs International to AIG Financial
Products Corp (Nov. 23, 2007), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2007-11-
23_AIG MarginCall_fromGoldmanSachs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W5K-G3SW; AIG/Goldman Sachs
Collateral Call Timeline, https:/fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-testimony/2010-0701 -
Goldman-AIG-Collateral-Call-timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T78-N99D].
263. For a summary of Goldman's approach to valuation in connection with the
collateral calls, see Goldman Sachs, Valuation and Pricing Related to Initial Collateral Calls on
Transactions with AIG, at 1-5 (Aug. 31, 2010) at 1-5, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-
docs/2010-08-31%2OGoldman%2OSachs%20-
%20Valuation%20and%20Pricing%2ORelated%20to%20Initial%2OCollateral%2OCalls%20on%2OTran
sactions%20with%20AIG.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2DJ-VS52].
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basis for calculating the amount of variation margin that AIG was required to
post.264 By September 12, 2008, these calculations had led Goldman to request
just over $9 billion in collateral from AIG in connection with its exposures under
33 CDS contracts providing protection against the super senior tranches of multi-
sector CDOs. 265
The negotiations between AIG and Goldman Sachs over the accuracy of
Goldman's calculations-and thus the reasonableness of its collateral calls are
notable for three reasons. The first is simply their length. As described in Part
III.B, the dispute resolution mechanism under a typical CSA envisions that
disagreements about variation margin requirements or the value of posted
collateral will be resolved no later than the next business day.266 Where
counterparties are unable to resolve a dispute within this timeframe, they will
then generally seek quotes from several dealers.267 Against this backdrop, what
is remarkable about the negotiation between AIG and Goldman Sachs is that it
went on for nearly fourteen months: from July 27, 2007 to AIG's collapse on
September 16, 2008. But for the intervention of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, it is highly likely that these negotiations would have gone on even
longer-or at least until AIG filed for bankruptcy.268
Part of the explanation for the length of these negotiations no doubt resides
in the uncertainty (and resulting disagreement) surrounding the value of the
underlying CDOs. The email correspondence between the two firms published
by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission is dominated by discussions around
the valuation methodology that Goldman used to determine its prices-or
"marks"-for the relevant CDOs.2 69 The sheer size of the collateral calls was
264. Id. at 6.
265. AIG/Goldman Sachs Collateral Call Timeline, supra note 262, at 15.
266. See discussion of New York law CSA, ¶ 5(i)(B), supra notes 109-114 &
accompanying text, at 30. AIG and Goldman Sachs werejoint Calculation Agents under the relevant CSA.
See AIG Super Senior Credit Transactions Principal Collateral Provisions, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2007), http:/fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2007-12-
07%20AIG%20Super%20Senior%2OCredit%20Transactions-
%20Principal%2OCollateral%20Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9T-XK2Y].
267. See New York law CSA, ¶ 5(i)(B). The CSA between AIG and Goldman Sachs
contemplated the use of average mid-market quotations from five dealers (and then excluding the highest
and lowest valuations). The agreement was silent on the question of what would happen if they were
unable to get the minimum number of dealer quotes. AIG Super Senior Credit Transactions Principal
Collateral Provisions, supra note 267, at 4.
268. Indeed, the parties actually entered into two additional side letters in relation to
outstanding collateral calls after the Fed's intervention on September 16, 2008. See FCIC, AIG/Goldman
Sachs Collateral Call Timeline, supra note 262, at 16.
269. See, e.g., Email Between Joe Cassano, Andrew Forster, William Dooley, and Elias
Habayeb Regarding Collateral Calls (Nov. 27, 2007), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-
docs/2007-11-
27_AIGEmailsbetweenJoeCassanoAndrewForsterWilliam Dooley and EliasHabayeb regard
ingcollateralcalls.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R8Z-SC8W]; AIG Email Regarding BET Valuation for Multi-
Sector CDO Book (Jan. 11, 2008), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2008-01-
11%20AI G % 2OEmail%20re%20BET%20Valuation%20for%2OMulti%20Sector%20CDO%2OBook.pdf
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also highly unusual and might have necessitated a brief delay in the performance
of AIG's obligations in order to enable it to secure the required collateral. At the
same time, both counterparties appear to have been very much aware of the
potential impact of the negotiation on both their own future relationship and their
reputations in the marketplace. Joe Cassano, CEO of AIG Financial Products-
the AIG subsidiary that had entered into the CDS contracts-stressed in an email
to colleagues at the height of the negotiations that disputes with Goldman Sachs
were "unusual"2 70 and that the firm was "a business partner of ours and an
important relationship."27 ' Other AIG employees involved in the negotiations
acknowledged the need to "manage the relationship" with Goldman.272 At least
one senior executive at Goldman Sachs, meanwhile, recognized that the size and
suddenness of the collateral calls could be "embarrassing for the firm"273 :
undermining its relationship with AIG, raising questions about its valuation
methodologies, and potentially signaling to other counterparties that, when the
chips were down, Goldman's interests would trump those of its clients.274 This
executive urged Goldman to exercise caution, both in terms of how it approached
the negotiations with AIG and in the way it communicated with the wider
marketplace.2 75
Second, over the course of the negotiations, both AIG and Goldman Sachs
demonstrated a degree of flexibility in their bargaining positions. Despite its
initial posturing, Goldman reduced the amount of its initial collateral call from
$1.8 to $1.2 billion on August 2, 2007.276 AIG reciprocated by posting $450
million in collateral pursuant to the terms of a side letter dated August 10,
2007.277 Joe Cassano described this move as a show of "good faith," with another
[https://perma.cc/YEA4-CFXF]; Email from Joe Cassano to Michael Sherwood and David Viniar (Jan.
16, 2008), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2008-01-
16_AIGEmailfromCassanotoSherwood regardingCDOvaluations.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN58-
DD3F]; Email from Joe Cassano to William Dooley and Steven Bensinger (Mar. 7, 2008), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2008-03-
07%20AIG%20Cassano%20email%20to%2ODooley%20and%2OBensinger.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3VW-XBZG]. See also COHAN, supra note 259, at 577-91. It was subsequently
revealed that AIG had no internal valuation methodology for pricing the relevant assets.
270. COHAN, supra note 259, at 579.
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Email from Alan Frost to Andrew Forster (Aug. 16, 2007), http:/fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2007-08-
16_AIG Email-fromAndrewForstertoAlan_Frost regardingGoldman_Sachs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJX7-YG2F].
273. COHAN supra note 259, at 577-78 (quoting Ram Sundaram, then Goldman Sachs
Managing Director of Proprietary Trading).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See AIG/Goldman Sachs Collateral Call Timeline, supra note 262, at 4. These
changes were largely based on concessions Goldman made in terms of how it calculated the amount of
required collateral.
277. Id.
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AIG executive explaining that it was intended "to get everyone to chill out."278
While continuing to dispute Goldman's marks, AIG would go on to post
additional collateral on a number of subsequent occasions ultimately reaching
a total of just over $6.8 billion as of August 28, 2008.279 As revealed by AIG's
internal correspondence, these payments were designed to buy the counterparties
time to identify an effective mechanism for resolving both the current and,
importantly, any future valuation disputes.280
Finally, despite the understandable stress and tension involved in
negotiations of this magnitude, the behavior of the personnel representing both
AIG and Goldman reflected the expectation that the firms would continue to do
business with each other after the resolution of the dispute. 281 One AIG
executive, for example, characterized the negotiations as "friendly discussions"
rather than "disputed calls."282 This points to what is perhaps the most notable
aspect of the negotiations: despite the enormously high stakes, neither
counterparty appears to have seriously considered threatening let alone
actually seeking-recourse to formal contractual enforcement. Nor crucially did
they utilize the dispute resolution mechanism under the CSA. As described in
Part III.B, this mechanism requires counterparties to resolve disputes within
extremely tight and rigid timeframes. Perhaps more importantly, the use of this
mechanism and specifically the process of obtaining quotes from other
dealers would have signaled to other market participants that there was a
serious valuation dispute.2 83 This behavior almost certainly reflects the
fundamental uncertainty that the parties faced in the thick of the financial crisis.
Importantly, however, it is also consistent with the desire to preserve a profitable
278. Email from Alan Frost to Andrew Forster, supra note 272.
279. For an overview, see AIG/Goldman Sachs Collateral Call Timeline, supra note
262. During this period, AIG also requested that Goldman return posted collateral on a number of
occasions. Id.
280. See, e.g., AIG Email from Alan Frost to Andrew Forster (Aug. 15, 2007),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/30464-aig-email-from-andrew-forster-to-alan-frost-
regarding-goldman-sachs [https://perma.cc/BKE3-YWYM] ("Everyone wants [the collateral call dispute]
to go away, but the primary focus [of the negotiations] is to think if we can establish a way of dealing
with this if we need to again.") (emphasis added).
281. As you might expect, this stress and tension was often reflected in internal emails.
Early on in the dispute, for example, one AIG executive complained that "[Goldman Sachs] are not
budging and acting irrational." Email from Tom Athan to Andrew Forster (Aug. 1, 2007),
https:/fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/fct/fcic/fcicdocs_aiggoldmantimeline_20100630.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4DB-DNRX]. Ultimately, however, the tone of these internal emails stands in sharp
contrast with the frank but nevertheless polite and constructive tone of the correspondence between the
two firms.
282. Andrew Forster, AIG Status of Collateral Call Postings, at 1 (Dec. 31, 2007),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2007-12-
31 AIG-Status-of Collateral-Call Postings.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK7K-7ZAE]; see also COHAN supra
note 259, at 581-84.
283. See, e.g., Email from Joe Cassano to William Dooley and Steven Bensinger, supra
note 269 (reporting that Goldman Vice Chair Michael Sherwood thought "it would be 'embarrassing' if
we brought the market into our disagreement" by obtaining dealer quotes). The parties were also skeptical
about whether they could identify a sufficient number of dealers willing and able to provide the necessary
quotes.
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trading relationship and avoid acquiring a reputation in the marketplace as a
litigious or uncooperative counterparty.
The negotiations between AIG and Goldman Sachs hold out a number of
insights into the role that reputation and the expectation of future dealings can
play in addressing the risks posed by incomplete contracting. Paramount
amongst these insights is that these informal mechanisms can motivate
counterparties to retain a degree of flexibility under circumstances where the
rigid application of state-contingent contracts becomes technically impossible:
e.g., because there are no observable market prices. Along the same vein, these
mechanisms can serve as a safety valve in circumstances where the use of other
formal mechanisms would have potentially undesirable side effects: e.g.,
because obtained dealer quotes would reveal potentially damaging information
to the marketplace. Reputation and the expectation of future dealings can thus be
understood as providing the counterparties with valuable optionality. Whereas
state-contingent contracting, property rights, and the allocation of decision-
making authority may work well under normal market conditions, these informal
mechanisms can thus play an important role where changes to market or
counterparty credit risk are not observable, or in the presence of fundamental
uncertainty about prevailing market conditions, the value of property rights, or
the impact of delegated decision-making (see Figure 10).
Importantly, the formal and informal mechanisms embedded within
derivative contracts can also be viewed as mutually reinforcing one another. For
example, how Valuation Agents approach disputed calculations can provide
parties with useful information about the propensity of their counterparties to
behave cooperatively (or opportunistically) in the process of resolving joint
problems. Over time, a demonstrated pattern of cooperative behavior in solving
these problems can then theoretically be used to build-up a reserve of goodwill
that can be tapped during periods of uncertainty. The expectation of cooperative
behavior can also induce counterparties to agree to more detailed state-
contingent terms or mechanisms contemplating the allocation of property or
decision-making rights at the outset of the relationship-safe in the knowledge
that the prospect of opportunism will be effectively constrained by the threat of
reputational sanctions and the loss of future earnings. What might initially look
like a relatively straightforward state-contingent contract can thus be viewed as
intricately braided with strong and yet supple relational threads.
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Figure 10: The Braiding ofState-Contingent Contracting and Other
Mechanisms
and delivery
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* Payment netting
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The negotiations between AIG and Goldman Sachs also highlight the limits
of these informal mechanisms. As a preliminary matter, Goldman's approach
toward the negotiations may have been different had AIG not been such an
important client or if AIG had not owed Goldman so much money. More
generally, contracting parties will often face powerful countervailing incentives.
The use of collateral, for example, reduces ex ante incentives to make significant
relationship-specific investments, thereby making it less likely that these
relationships would be fully developed in ex post states of the world
characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Once the counterparties were
actually confronted with this uncertainty, the provision of collateral also reduced
Goldman's skin in the game and thus its motivation to work constructively
toward a timely and effective resolution to the valuation dispute.
Reputation and the expectation of future dealings may have also worked at
cross purposes, with Goldman's desire to preserve its relationship with AIG
potentially conflicting with its desire to protect its reputation in the marketplace.
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Specifically, whereas the desire to retain AIG as a client would have incentivized
Goldman to work constructively toward the resolution of the dispute, the desire
to protect its own reputation appears to have influenced its decision to initially
reject one possible solution-obtaining dealer quotes that would have revealed
potentially damaging information to the marketplace. Along the same vein,
Goldman's standing and relationships within the tight knit dealer community
may have represented a more powerful influence on its approach toward the
negotiations than its relationships with either AIG or the rest of its more widely
dispersed client base.
Third, the negotiations between AIG and Goldman Sachs were fraught with
asymmetries of information and bargaining power. By virtue of its privileged
position as a dealer, Goldman knew far more than AIG about the prevailing
market conditions for both CDS contracts and the underlying CDOs.284 Goldman
had also made significant investments in developing relatively robust
methodologies for valuing the CDOs at the heart of the dispute.285 Indeed,
despite its strenuous and repeated objections to Goldman's valuation
methodologies, it was subsequently revealed that AIG had not actually
developed its own proprietary methods for valuing the securities against which
it had sold credit protection.286 The resulting asymmetries of information and
expertise gave Goldman a clear advantage in the negotiations and, in theory at
least, exposed AIG to some level of opportunism.
Finally, reputation and expectation of future dealings are unlikely to
mitigate the risks posed by incomplete contracting where significant doubts arise
regarding a counterparty's solvency. The reason for this is relatively
straightforward: any increase in the probability of a party's insolvency should
result in a corresponding decrease in its counterparty's expectations regarding
the future revenue stream from the relationship. Where a party is not fully
collateralized, any increase in the probability of a counterparty's insolvency will
also result in a commensurate increase in counterparty credit risk. In this regard,
it is worth noting that while Goldman was working with AIG toward a resolution
of the valuation dispute, it was also purchasing billions of dollars of credit
protection against the risk of AIG's default.287 Regardless of the prevailing level
of uncertainty, the threat of insolvency can thus trigger a shift away from reliance
on informal mechanisms such as reputation and the expectation of future
dealings and toward strict enforcement of formal contract and property rights
(see Figure 10).
284. See Goldman Sachs, Valuation and Pricing Related to Initial Collateral Calls on
Transactions with AIG, supra note 263.
285. For further details regarding these methodologies, see id.
286. See Testimony of AIG Executives Before the FCIC (June 30, 2010), http:/fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcic-docs/2010-06-
30%2OCraig%20Broderick%20Written%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT7W-NBGP].
287. See AIG/Goldman Sachs Collateral Call Timeline, supra note 262, at 2, 4-8, 10-
15 (detailing the level of Goldman's CDS protection against AIG's default between July 27, 2007 and
September 12, 2008).
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Turning these limits on their head enables us to make some tentative
predictions about when these relational mechanisms are most likely to represent
binding constraints on counterparty behavior. Perhaps most importantly, we
would expect to find stronger relational elements in the context of counterparty
relationships between larger firms, engaged across a number of different
business lines, and with a high volume of bilateral transaction activity. This
prediction is consistent with anecdotal evidence that prior to the financial
crisis-large dealers typically did not require other dealers to post collateral. As
we shall see, this prediction has important implications in terms of the impact of
relational mechanisms on the stability of derivatives markets.
For all their sophistication, derivative contracts-like most contracts are
fundamentally incomplete. While this incompleteness may be immaterial in
good times, in bad times it exposes counterparties to the risk of inefficient
outcomes and potential opportunism. Counterparties employ a number of
mechanisms to address these risks: ranging from formal mechanisms such as
collateral, the designation of Valuation Agents, and standards-based contracting,
to informal mechanisms such as reputation and the expectation of future
dealings. Ultimately, however, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is subject
to important limits-limits that depend on the idiosyncratic relationship between
the counterparties and the unique circumstances in which they find themselves.
Accordingly, while these mechanisms can help make derivative contracts more
resilient in the face of uncertainty, they do not represent a complete solution to
the problems of incomplete contracting.
IV. Policy Implications
The process of splitting derivative contracts open reveals a complex and
heterogeneous bundle of different elements. The resulting hybridity yields a
number of important and timely policy insights. Two in particular stand out.
First, the braiding of contract, property, decision-making rights, and relational
mechanisms serves to distinguish derivatives from conventional equity and debt
securities. This necessitates an examination of whether the regulatory regimes
that apply to these securities are properly tailored to derivatives markets. Second,
the flexibility associated with the relational mechanisms embedded within many
derivative contracts represents something of a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, by incentivizing cooperative problem solving and renegotiation under
conditions of fundamental uncertainty, these mechanisms can play a useful role
in promoting both institutional and broader financial stability. On the other hand,
the widespread breakdown of these mechanisms can be a source of financial
instability.
These insights raise a host of broader policy questions. Is the hybridity of
derivative contracts socially desirable? If so, how can we replicate it across
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different market structures-and during periods of fundamental uncertainty? If
not, how can we eliminate it without tearing at the fabric of derivatives markets?
And more generally, is this hybridity sustainable within an increasingly large,
complex, and atomized financial system? This Part explores these important
questions, along with their possible future implications in terms of the structure
and regulation of derivatives markets.
A. The Regulation ofDerivatives as Securities
The first and, in many respects, most straightforward question is whether
derivative contracts should be regulated as securities. The definition of a
"security" under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933288 encompasses a
diverse range of financial instruments including conventional stocks and bonds;
notes, debentures, and other evidence of indebtedness; call and put options on
securities; indices of securities; and investment contracts. 28 9 This diversity
obscures an important fact: one of the hallmarks of securities is that financial
instruments belonging to a particular class are legally and economically
identical. Each and every common share of Apple Inc. entitles a shareholder to
exactly the same bundle of residual cash flow and governance rights. Every bond
issued by AT&T Inc. represents a contractually enforceable promise by the same
counterparty to make periodic interest payments and repay investor's principal.
In the case of publicly traded securities, conventional stock exchanges have also
historically provided a form of standardized private law governing, amongst
other matters, issuer disclosure obligations, the governance of listed firms, and
the mechanics of buying and selling listed securities. 290 While most of this
private law has now been supplanted by public regulation, the effect has
nevertheless been to inject an extremely high degree of homogeneity into both
publicly traded securities and the legal and institutional environment in which
they trade.29 '
288. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a
et seq.).
289. For a more detailed overview of the definition of a "security," see JAMES COX,
ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 27-89
(7th ed. 2013).
290. See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange
Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 297 (2002); Jonathan Macey &
Maureen O'Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics
Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999); Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV.
1453 (1997).
291. Notably, elements of this homogeneity and specifically the institutional
environment in which trading takes place-are in the process of being eroded by the emergence of
alternative trading systems as competitors to conventional stock exchanges. For an overview of these
systems and their impact on the trading environment for publicly-traded equity securities, see Merritt Fox,
Lawrence Golsten & Gabriel Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191
(2015).
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This homogeneity is essential to the effectiveness of the traditional
securities law strategy of subsidizing the production of information. Federal
securities laws utilize two primary mechanisms in pursuit of this strategy. The
first is the imposition of prospectus, event-driven, and continuous disclosure
requirements on issuers of securities.2 The second is the imposition of pre- and
post-trade transparency requirements.293 These transparency requirements
impose an affirmative obligation on stock exchanges and other trading platforms
to publicly disseminate bid, ask, and other pre-trade information.294 They also
require post-trade dissemination of price, volume, and other information in
connection with executed trades.2 95 These requirements are designed to enhance
market transparency, ultimately with the objective of improving the process of
price discovery and market efficiency.296
Importantly, these transparency requirements are designed to work in a
world where all securities of a particular class, issued by a particular issuer, are
completely homogeneous. In order for trade pricing and other information to be
valuable to market participants, the shares of Apple Inc. bought and sold in
connection with one trade must be identical to those bought and sold in
subsequent trades. If they are not, we would expect market participants to invest
time and effort in understanding the differences between types of Apple shares,
along with the impact of these differences from a valuation perspective. Where
these differences were material, we would also expect to observe different prices
for each type of share. Viewed from this perspective, the key benefit of
homogeneity is that it enables market participants to decode the informational
signal sent by changes in price from one trade to the next, confident that these
changes do not reflect any underlying legal or economic differences between
securities.
By comparison, the most important feature of derivative contracts is their
inherent heterogeneity. This heterogeneity stems from two principal sources.
First, despite increasing contractual standardization, the detailed state-contingent
292. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, §§ 12, 13, 15(d), 48 Stat. 881
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.) (imposing continuous and event-driven disclosure requirements)
[hereinafter Securities Exchange Act of 1934]; Securities Act of 1933, Pub L. No. 73-22, §§ 5, 10, 48
Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.) (imposing registration and prospectus requirements).
293. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 292, § 11 A; SEC, SEC RELEASE No.
34-51808, REGULATION NMS (2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WM2U-GRKH] [hereinafter REGULATION NMS].
294. REGULATION NMS, supra note 293, at 490-502, 516-18 (outlining rules 602-04
and 610). Alternative trading platforms are a notable exception, where regulatory rules contemplate the
non-application or waiver of pre-trade transparency requirements in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. §§ 202, 240, 242, 249 (2018).
295. REGULATION NMS, supra note 293, at 487-90, 503-06 (outlining Rules 601 and
605).
296. For a discussion of how securities laws attempt to achieve these objectives, see
John Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV.
717 (1984); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
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terms at the heart of derivative contracts can still vary across a number of
important dimensions: from the governing law of the contract, to various
elections under the schedule, to the terms of the CSA governing the amount,
quality, and to the timing of initial and variation margin requirements.2 97 The
legal terms governing two ostensibly identical swaps may therefore diverge
considerably in practice. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
idiosyncratic aspects of the relationship between the counterparties will
inevitably introduce a degree of economic heterogeneity even in relation to
legally identical contracts. These differences stem from the creditworthiness of
the counterparties, the size of their outstanding exposures to one another, the
nature and scope of their existing business relationship, and their expectations
regarding any future dealings.2 98 Accordingly, while market participants might
not care very much about the identity of the buyer when they sell one hundred
shares of Apple Inc., they will likely care very deeply about the identity of the
counterparty with whom they enter into a five-year total return equity swap on
the very same shares.
In theory, these differences can have a significant impact on the price of a
derivative contract. Where these differences are costly to observe, they will also
make it very difficult for market participants to disentangle the constituent
elements of price reflecting market, counterparty credit, and other risks. The
resulting heterogeneity can thus introduce significant price distortions:
undermining the ability of market participants to separate the informational
signal associated within any price changes from the noise generated by legal and
economic differences between derivative contracts. 299 These distortions can
impede the process of price discovery, thereby undercutting the efficiency of
derivatives markets.3 00
The heterogeneity of derivative contracts thus raises serious questions
about the effectiveness of recent regulatory reforms designed to enhance the
transparency of derivatives markets. In the years leading up to the global
financial crisis, derivatives were largely exempt from the application of federal
securities laws. 30' This laissez faire regulatory treatment arguably reflected the
prevailing political climate more than any consensus around whether derivatives
should be regulated as securities. 302 In the wake of the crisis, however,
297. See Section II.A for a description of these terms and a sense of how they can vary
from contract to contract.
298. The question of whether mandatory central clearing will help eliminate these
differences is examined in Section IV.B. See also Awrey, supra note 13, at 1165-69.
299. Awrey, supra note 13, at 1125-32, 1156-62.
300. Id.
301. In the United States, the disapplication of federal securities law was introduced
under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. Law No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
302. See Romano, supra note 14; Stout, supra note 14; see also Sheila Bair, Regulatory
Issues Presented by the Growth of OTC Derivatives: Why Off-Exchange is No Longer Off- Limits, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS (Robert Klein & Jess Lederman eds.. 1994): Willa
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policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to extend the
reach of securities laws to derivatives markets. As described in Part II.C, this has
included the introduction of trade reporting and disclosure requirements broadly
similar to those imposed on conventional equity and debt securities. 30 3 The stated
objective of these requirements is to make derivative trade pricing and other
information available to the marketplace on a more timely basis in order to
support the process of price discovery.3 04 Ultimately, however, while these new
requirements will undoubtedly serve to increase the volume of available
information, the price distortions stemming from the heterogeneity of derivative
contracts represent a significant obstacle to improving price discovery and
market efficiency.
In addition to calling into question whether derivatives should be regulated
as conventional securities, the fact that derivatives are heterogeneous debt
contracts suggests that rather than focusing narrowly on enhancing
transparency the new trade reporting and disclosure requirements should be
used to aggregate and disseminate information about two far more significant
and pressing species of risk. The first species includes microprudential risks
stemming the implicit leverage embedded within derivative contracts, the
liquidity risks associated with correlated collateral calls, and operational risks
stemming from the failure to manage these risks effectively. These
microprudential risks contributed to the collapse of both AIG and Bear
Steams.305 They also played a significant role in the 1998 failure of hedge fund
Long-Term Capital Management.306
The second species includes macroprudential risks stemming from the
failure of systemically important derivatives counterparties (including
clearinghouses) or the correlated withdrawal of liquidity by dealers during
periods of market turmoil. 307 During the crisis, it was these macroprudential risks
that motivated the federal government to rescue AIG and, through AIG, major
derivatives dealers such as Goldman Sachs.308 At present, the Dodd-Frank Act
Gibson, Are Swaps Agreements Securities or Futures? The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional
Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379 (1999); David Gilberg,
Regulation ofNew Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1599 (1986); Thomas Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and Uncertain
Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 (1990).
303. See supra Section 1IC.
304. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(B) (2018).
305. See Congressional Oversight Panel, supra note 252; Duffie, supra note 59
(describing their role in the collapse of Bear Stearns).
306. For a detailed account of the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, see
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2000).
307. Awrey, supra note 13, at 1162-65.
308. See Congressional Oversight Panel, supra note 252 (describing how the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York purchased the CDOs underlying AIG's swap contracts with fifteen major
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transparency requirements focus on collecting and disseminating of
information namely prices that is essentially relevant to understanding how
derivatives work in good times. The existence of these significant
microprudential and macroprudential risks underscores the importance of also
collecting and disseminating information that can help us better understand how
derivatives markets work and sometimes don't-in bad times.
In theory, the Dodd-Frank Act trade reporting and disclosure requirements
could be used to compel SDRs to collect and share information that would assist
regulators and market participants to better measure, monitor, and manage these
prudential risks. Thus, for example, SDRs could be required to collect granular
transaction-level data regarding the identity of counterparties, the amount and
quality of posted collateral, whether collateral is posted pursuant to a title transfer
or security interest system, whether counterparties can reuse or re-hypothecate
collateral, the triggers and frequency of variation margin calculations, and any
thresholds or minimum transfer amounts. 309 This information could then be used
to monitor the concentration of market and counterparty credit risk on the
balance sheets of derivatives dealers, clearinghouses, and other major
counterparties. It could also be used to better map the global network of
derivative contracts, measure its interconnectedness, and identify potential
weaknesses. By viewing derivatives through the prism of traditional securities
regulation, we may therefore be missing out on an important opportunity to shine
a light on what are ultimately the most significant risks generated by the
widespread use of derivatives.
These prudential risks also raise questions about who should be responsible
for the regulation and supervision of derivatives markets. The Dodd-Frank Act
divides responsibility between the SEC and CFTC.3 10 While the CFTC has some
experience with prudential regulation and supervision by virtue of its historical
oversight of futures exchanges and clearinghouses, the SEC has no significant
expertise in the design or implementation of prudential rules. Indeed, the SEC's
only previous prudential mandate-the ill-fated Consolidated Supervised
Entities (CSE) program was an unmitigated disaster. 31' Established in 2004,
counterparties, including major derivatives dealers Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, and
HSBC).
309. While the Real-Time Reporting Rule adopted under Section 727 of the Dodd-
Frank Act does require counterparties to inform SDRs about "whether a swap is collateralized," this binary
requirement does not sufficiently capture the range of dimensions across which collateralization can vary.
Dodd-Frank Act, § 727.
310. Regulatory responsibility is based on the distinction between "swaps" (subject to
CFTC oversight), "security-based swaps" (subject to SEC oversight), and "mixed swaps" (subject to joint
oversight). See Dodd-Frank Act, § § 721, 761. At the same time, federal banking regulators such as the
Federal Reserve Board and Office of the Controller of the Currency maintain an important role in setting
capital and margin rules for derivative counterparties that are authorized as banks.
311. For an overview of the CSE Program, see SEC OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., R.
NO. 446-A. SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
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the CSE program permitted large investment banks registered with the SEC as
broker-dealers to voluntarily use their own internal models to calculate their
minimum regulatory capital requirements. Participating firms were then subject
to consolidated prudential supervision by the SEC. The list of firms that
participated in the program reads like a Who's Who of the financial crisis:
Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman
Sachs. An internal audit of the CSE program conducted following the failure of
Bear Steams concluded that "it is undisputable that the CSE program failed to
carry out its mission" to monitor and respond on a timely basis to the build-up
of potential prudential risks.312 The program was unceremoniously shut down in
September 2008.313 What this example suggests is that securities regulators may
not always have the institutional focus, technocratic expertise, or other resources
necessary to engage in effective prudential oversight. It also suggests that, where
the policy decisions of securities regulators have a significant prudential
dimension, these decisions should be subject to review by regulatory authorities
with direct responsibility for-and expertise in prudential regulation and
supervision.314
B. The Desirability ofMandatory Central Clearing
The authors of the Dodd-Frank Act were not blind to the significant
prudential risks posed by the widespread use of derivatives. Far from it. The shift
toward mandatory central clearing was expressly motivated by the desire to more
effectively manage counterparty credit risk within derivatives markets. This shift
has led to a marked increase in the volume of trading activity routed through
clearinghouses, along with the imposition of strict rules governing trade
reporting, initial and variation margin requirements, and the allocation of losses
amongst clearinghouses and their members. The salient question thus becomes:
are these rules desirable in light of the problems posed by incomplete contracting
within derivatives markets?
We have already seen how incomplete contracting can generate suboptimal
outcomes in the context of bilaterally cleared derivatives markets. This risk is
SUPERVISED ENTITIES PROGRAM (2008), https://www.sec.gov/files/446-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNM4-
MMSQ].
312. Id. at viii.
313. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html
[https://perma.cc/4YQW-5XSU].
314. In theory, this is a role that could be performed by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC). In practice, however, the FSOC does not generally deal with technical regulatory or
supervisory matters. Nevertheless, one could envision a governance structure such as the one currently in
place in the United Kingdom: where the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England (the analogue
of the FSOC) has the authority to direct the Financial Conduct Authority (the domestic securities
regulator) in relation to the implementation of macroprudential measures. For an overview, see ARMOUR
ET AL., supra note 43, at 611-12.
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even more pronounced within a multilateral environment. Clearinghouses seek
to strengthen the credibility of contractual commitments by interposing
themselves between the original counterparties and then committing to perform
their obligations in accordance with a clearly defined set of ex ante rules that
apply to all counterparties and transactions. These rules include strict variation
margin requirements and the various loss allocation and mutualization
mechanisms that collectively make up a clearinghouse's default waterfall.
Importantly, the execution of these rules is often highly automated. The business
model of clearinghouses is thus specifically engineered to prevent counterparties
from renegotiating their contracts in response to changing circumstances or in
the face of fundamental uncertainty.3 15 Put simply, clearinghouses are designed
to eliminate the heterogeneous, relational elements of derivative contracts.
Yet if the rules adopted by a clearinghouse are themselves incomplete, we
might predict that strict adherence to these rules will, in at least some states of
the world, yield socially undesirable outcomes. Perhaps the best example of this
is known as "wrong way" risk. Wrong way risk refers to the prospect that the
strict enforcement of clearinghouse rules governing variation margin
requirements, contingent capital calls, or the enforced allocation of positions, for
example, could undermine the liquidity or solvency of a clearing member. Where
this wrong way risk results in clearing member default, the loss mutualization
mechanisms employed by the clearinghouse could then become a conduit for the
transmission of liquidity or solvency problems to other clearing members and
perhaps even the clearinghouse itself. In theory, therefore, the very same
mechanisms that clearinghouses use to make contractual commitments more
credible can also be viewed as binding their hands and, ultimately, as a source of
contractual rigidity and potential institutional and systemic instability.
Clearinghouses employ a number of mechanisms to address these risks.
One of the most important mechanisms is the authority to auction off the
positions of defaulting clearing members. Once a clearinghouse decides to hold
an auction, clearinghouse rules will typically impose an obligation on surviving
clearing members to submit good faith bids on these positions.316 In some cases,
the clearinghouse will also open up the auction to other market participants.
Where an auction fails to result in the sale of all the defaulting clearing member's
positions, the clearinghouse will then often have the power to forcibly allocate
the remaining positions amongst surviving clearing members at a price
315. Hart & Moore, Foundations, supra note 188, at 128 (describing how interposing
a "middleman" between contracting parties can strengthen contractual commitments by creating an
impediment to bilateral renegotiation).
316. Where a clearing member fails to submit a bid in good faith, the clearinghouse can
then impose sanctions on that member, including by allocating any remaining positions to that clearing
member after a failed auction.
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established by the clearinghouse. 317 These auctions can thus facilitate the orderly
reallocation of risk from defaulting to surviving clearing members.318 Perhaps
more importantly, during periods of market turmoil, auctions can help subsidize
the production of information about prevailing market conditions under
circumstances where, as we have seen, bilaterally cleared derivative markets are
prone to failure.
Clearinghouse rules also typically include mechanisms designed to
alleviate the pressures associated with contractual rigidity. Two potentially
important mechanisms are "tear-up" procedures and "variation margin gain
haircuts" (VMGH). As their name implies, tear-up procedures enable a
clearinghouse to terminate any outstanding derivative contracts with its clearing
members. In contrast with early termination following a Termination Event or
Event of Default, however, these tear-up procedures do not trigger a
corresponding obligation to calculate or pay an Early Termination Amount.
Instead, the counterparties and clearinghouse are simply released from all
future obligations in connection with the terminated contracts.319
VMGH, meanwhile, enables a clearinghouse to reduce or extinguish its
obligations to transfer collateral posted by counterparties in accordance with
variation margin requirements. While counterparties will still be required to post
margin, the application of VMGH contemplates that a clearinghouse can retain
some percentage of this collateral for the purposes of fortifying its own balance
sheet. Generally speaking, a clearinghouse will only be authorized to use tear-up
procedures or VMGH after other mechanisms in its default waterfall have been
employed to absorb losses stemming from the default of one or more clearing
members. Nevertheless, these mechanisms can be viewed as important safety
valves designed to prevent contractual rigidity from triggering or exacerbating
institutional or systemic instability.
Viewed from this perspective, the desirability of central clearing stems at
least in part from the centralization of decision-making authority during periods
of market turmoil. In stark contrast with bilaterally cleared derivatives markets,
this centralization enables clearinghouses to mount a coordinated response to the
threat of institutional or systemic instability. This response can include the use
of auctions to compel the production of trading information, thereby
redistributing risk and reducing the level of uncertainty within the marketplace.
It can also include the use of tear-up procedures, VMGH, or other similar
mechanisms designed to relax the strict application of clearinghouse rules,
317. DAVID MURPHY, OTC DERIVATIVES: BILATERAL TRADING AND CENTRAL
CLEARING 198 (2013).
318. Of course, whether this reallocation is efficient is another matter that will depend
on, inter alia, whether the surviving clearing members are themselves facing liquidity or solvency
problems.
319. This includes any obligation to return collateral posted by the counterparties in
accordance with variation margin requirements (although, simultaneously, tear-up procedures do often
contemplate that the clearinghouse will be obligated to return any initial margin posted by the
counterparties).
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thereby minimizing the potential knock-on effects of clearing member default.
This centralization of decision-making authority can thus be understood as a
potentially effective solution to many of the problems associated with
incomplete contracting.
By the same token, this centralization poses two potentially significant
risks. The first is the risk that a clearinghouse might inadvertently use these
mechanisms in ways that actually exacerbate institutional or systemic instability.
Tear-up procedures, VMGH, and the forcible allocation of positions to surviving
clearing members following a failed auction, for example, all serve to
redistribute risk amongst clearing members. Accordingly, each of these
mechanisms is a potential source of wrong way risk. This risk will be particularly
acute where clearinghouses do not possess comprehensive, real-time information
about prevailing market conditions or the balance sheets of their clearing
members. In short, the risk of error will be most pronounced during periods of
fundamental uncertainty.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, clearinghouses can use these
mechanisms to relax their own survival constraint at the expense of clearing
members. The vulnerability of clearing members to this potential of conflict of
interest is a function of two variables. The first variable is the governance model
of the clearinghouse and specifically the extent to which clearing members
exercise control over the design and application of clearinghouse rules. Thus, for
example, this conflict will be more pronounced where the clearinghouse is a
shareholder-owned corporation than where it is a member-owned cooperative.32 0
The second variable is whether the clearinghouse faces meaningful competition.
Specifically, where there exists little or no competition for clearing services in
connection with a particular type of derivative contract, a clearinghouse is
unlikely to face significant reputational sanctions or a loss of future revenue for
prioritizing its own survival over that of its clearing members. Ultimately, this
conflict of interest provides a compelling rationale for imposing regulatory
constraints around the design and application of these mechanisms by, for
example, imposing caps on the size of clearing member capital calls, tear-up
procedures, or VMGH. It also suggests that it may be desirable to transfer
decision-making authority over the use of these mechanisms to prudential
regulatory authorities in circumstances where the stability of a clearinghouse is
at stake.
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320. See for example, Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When Skin in
the Gamels NotEnough, theRemutualization ofClearinghouses, 34 YALE. J. ON REG. 601,640-48 (2017)
(describing the agency costs associated with different models of clearinghouse ownership and
governance).
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C. The Promise and Peril ofDistributed Ledger Technology and Smart
Contracts
One of the most exciting and controversial developments in finance over
the past several years has been the emergence of distributed ledger technology
(DLT). A distributed ledger is a database that is shared across a network of
computers, with each participant able to independently access and verify the
accuracy of the database at any given moment in time.321' All changes to the
database known as "transactions" are initiated by one or more participants
using public/private key cryptography.32 2 Once initiated, these transactions are
then validated by every other network participant, thereby creating a permanent,
tamper-proof, and up-to-date record of all historical transaction activity. While
Blockchain is undoubtedly the best known example of DLT, distributed ledgers
can vary across a number of dimensions.323 Most importantly for the present
purposes, while distributed ledgers such as Blockchain are public (or
'permissionless') networks, it is perfectly possible to create a private (or
'permissioned') network governed by a set of rules that is agreed to by all
participants.
Many of the most promising applications of DLT involve combining this
technology with so-called "smart contracts." Smart contracts are computer
protocols that are designed to execute a predetermined action upon the
occurrence of a specified future event.324 The concept of a smart contract has
been around for some time.325 Yet it is only with the emergence of DLT that the
full potential of smart contracts within the realm of finance has come into sharper
focus. Specifically, insofar as smart contracts can be embedded within a
distributed ledger, these protocols can theoretically be used to create entirely
self-executing state-contingent contracts. Thus, for example, a smart contract
could be used to capture the operational terms of a legally binding contract
321. Importantly, while all participants will be able to observe all transactional
information within the database, this information can still be presented in a way that ensures the anonymity
of participants.
322. Public/private key cryptography (often referred to simply as "public key"
cryptography) is an electronic security protocol that involves two bits of computer code known as "keys."
The first key is a public key known by all participants in the network. The second key is a private key
known only to the owner of the information in question. Transactions are initiated using the public key to
encrypt the information, which can then only be decrypted by the owner of the private key. These keys
combine to make a cryptographic signature that, in effect, authorizes the transaction. Within distributed
ledgers, this authorization is then followed by the validation of the transaction by other participants.
323. These dimensions include security features, the type of consensus mechanisms
used to validate transactions, and the processes used to "mine" the information necessary to validate
transactions.
324. Accordingly, "smart contracts" need not necessarily represent legally binding
contracts or, for that matter, be particularly smart.
325. See Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, ALAMUT
(1996), http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/nick szabo/smartContracts.html
[https://perma.cc/N9LS-354M].
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between two or more network participants contemplating payment by one
participant in the event of a specified future contingency. The occurrence of this
contingency would then automatically initiate a transaction within the distributed
ledger, thereby ensuring the transfer of payment pursuant to the terms of the
contract.32 6
Viewed from this perspective, the promise of combining DLT with smart
contracts stems from two related sources. The first is the ability to more or less
completely automate the execution, clearing, and settlement of financial
transactions from basic payments, to the purchase and sale of equity and debt
securities, to the processing of lifecycle events in connection with more
sophisticated financial contracts within a fully secure and transparent network
environment. The second is the ability to undertake these transactions without
the involvement of conventional financial intermediaries. For these reasons,
proponents of DLT and smart contracts often see them as the foundations of a
new financial market infrastructure: faster, cheaper, and more reliable than the
incumbent financial ecosystems that they seek to disrupt.
Perhaps not surprisingly, ISDA and other industry stakeholders have
identified DLT and smart contracts as offering a potentially promising
technological platform for reducing costs, minimizing operational risks, and
streamlining the lifecycle of derivative contracts.327 As a preliminary matter, the
fact that DLT creates a single, immutable, and constantly updated record of all
transactions eliminates the need for costly and duplicative trade reconciliation
processes, along with the operational risks associated with trade confirmation
backlogs. 328  This "golden record" 329  can assist counterparties in better
monitoring and managing their derivatives exposures, including ancillary
processes such as collateral management. It can also provide regulatory
authorities with a more complete and accurate picture of market structure and
activity, thereby improving both microprudential and macroprudential oversight
whilst simultaneously reducing the regulatory reporting burden on individual
326. Of course, in order for these contracts to be self-enforcing, the assets being
transferred in satisfaction of any payment obligation must themselves be embedded within the distributed
ledger. These embedded assets can include cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, along with "digitized"
versions of conventional currencies, securities, and other assets.
327. See ISDA, WHITE PAPER: THE FUTURE OF DERIVATIVES PROCESSING AND
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE (2016), https://www.isda.org/a/UEKDE/infrastructure-white-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63M2-8ZXD]; ISDA & LINKLATERS, WHITE PAPER: SMART CONTRACTS AND
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER -A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (2017), https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-
and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV7M-AT47].
328. ISDA, supra note 327, at 23. Ultimately, of course, whether DLT can eliminate
trade confirmation backlogs is also a function of a network's capacity to validate transactions in something
resembling real time.
329. Id.
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counterparties and SDRs.330 The prospect of a single, consolidated record looks
especially promising in comparison with the current state of play where
transactional data is often fragmented across different markets, institutions, and
jurisdictions.33 '
Perhaps even more revolutionary is the prospect that the detailed state-
contingent terms at the heart of derivative contracts could be structured as smart
contracts and embedded within a distributed ledger. As we have already seen,
the modus ponens (if/then) structure of basic payment and delivery obligations
renders these terms highly susceptible to being expressed in the form of
executable computer code. 332 The same is true of initial and variation margin
requirements. Where necessary, these smart contracts could then be linked to
third party data sources-or "oracles"-that would provide the necessary input
variables: e.g., share prices, benchmark interest rates, or news that an issuer had
defaulted on its corporate debt. Where changes in these input variables triggered
an obligation under a smart contract, this would then automatically initiate the
necessary transactions within the distributed ledger. The combination of DLT
and smart contracts could thus provide the foundations for an even greater degree
of automation within derivatives markets and perhaps eventually the complete
digitization of derivative contracts.3 33
Lastly, DLT and smart contracts could be used to create a new breed of
crypto-clearinghouses. These clearinghouses could be structured as
permissioned networks, enabling network administrators to impose participant
entry requirements, ensure that participants maintain a minimum level of capital
in the network, and sanction participants that violate clearinghouse rules by
restricting or blocking access to the network. These technologies could then be
used to automate routine transactions such as the posting and return of initial and
variation margin. It could also be used to automate periodic events such as
clearing member capital calls, tear-ups, VMGH, and the allocation of positions
following a failed auction. While the establishment of crypto-clearinghouses
would obviously run counter to the technologists' vision of a world without
financial intermediaries, the benefits of using this new technology to automate
the existing loss allocation and mutualization mechanisms employed by
clearinghouses could ultimately be very significant.
330. Id.; ISDA & LINKLATERS, supra note 327, at 3; Katharina Pistor, Re-Imagining
Finance: The Promise of Decentralized Technologies 9 (July 31, 2017) (unpublished concept paper) (on
file with author).
331. ISDA, supra note 327, at 3, 14; ISDA & LINKLATERS, supra note 327, at 4.
332. ISDA & LINKLATERS, supra note 327, at 19 ("Derivatives are fertile territory for
the application of smart contracts and DLT because their main payments and deliveries are heavily
dependent on conditional logic.").
333. In theory, it could provide the foundations for interoperability between
clearinghouses, and perhaps even between bilaterally and centrally cleared derivatives markets.
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In order to capitalize on the promise of DLT and smart contracts we would
first need to address a host of practical challenges. One threshold challenge is
the digitization of both derivative contracts and collateral assets for the purpose
of incorporating them into a distributed ledger. This digitization would require
the adoption of a standardized coding language and data reporting standards,
along with unique legal entity, product, and transaction identifiers.334 A second
challenge would be how to integrate contractual terms that are not easily
susceptible to being captured in the form of executable computer code.335
Important terms falling into this category include Termination Events and Events
of Default, both of which contemplate some level of interpretation and
optionality and, thus, human intervention.336 More broadly, we would need to
establish the precise relationship between smart contracts and the underlying
legal architecture.337 Finally, the informational benefits flowing from the
adoption of DLT would ultimately hinge on the size of the relevant networks.
Accordingly, where networks are fragmented along product, institutional, or
jurisdictional lines, it may be difficult to extract many of the most important
benefits of this new technology.
Ultimately, however, by far and away the most fundamental challenges
associated with the adoption of DLT and smart contracts stem from the problems
posed by incomplete contracting and, most importantly, how to replicate the
flexibility associated with the relational mechanisms embedded within many
derivative contracts. There is absolutely no reason to think that the code
underpinning smart contracts would be any more or less complete than the
current legal architecture supporting derivatives markets. The high level of
automation associated with DLT is also a potential source of both transaction-
level and network-wide contractual rigidity. Thus, for example, the strict and
automatic enforcement of variation margin requirements or closeout netting
using smart contracts would foreclose any opportunity for the counterparties to
negotiate a more efficient outcome. At the very least, this contractual
incompleteness and rigidity suggests that existing mechanisms such as collateral,
Valuation Agents, and broad standards can still play an important role within this
new market infrastructure. More importantly, it suggests that we need to think
carefully about how to build safety valves into these networks in order to prevent
this incompleteness and rigidity from triggering institutional or broader systemic
instability.
Computer scientists Ittay Eyal and Emin Giin Sirer, for example, have
proposed a decentralized consensus mechanism or "escape hatch"-that would
permit a quorum of network participants to temporarily delay and potentially
334. ISDA, supra note 327, at 16-17, 19-20.
335. Id. at 11-13.
336. Id. at 17.
337. See id. at 13-18 for a survey of some of the possible options in this regard.
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unwind transactions within a distributed ledger.338 This mechanism could
theoretically be used to suspend the automated enforcement of contractual
obligations in times of crisis. Once the crisis had passed, this mechanism could
then initiate the execution of any suspended or unwound transactions. Along the
same vein, one could envision giving regulatory authorities the ability to suspend
the automated execution of transactions in the interests of promoting network
and financial stability. While the optimal design of these safety valves is beyond
the scope of this Article, one or more mechanisms would appear to be necessary
in order to address the risk that incomplete contracting within a distributed ledger
could become a source of financial instability.
D. The Role of Central Banks as Dealers ofLast Resort
We have already seen how relational mechanisms such as reputation and
the expectation of future dealings can help reduce the risks posed by incomplete
contracting. We have also seen how these mechanisms can break down where
parties begin to harbor doubts about the creditworthiness of their counterparties.
But what happens when these doubts become more widespread? As painfully
illustrated during the global financial crisis, parties will often indiscriminately
question the creditworthiness of their counterparties during periods of
widespread market turmoil and fundamental uncertainty. These questions
manifest themselves as a systemic collective action problem, triggering the
withdrawal of market liquidity from short-term wholesale funding, derivatives,
and other markets.339 The existence of pervasive uncertainty can thus drive a
destructive and self-reinforcing feedback loop: with doubts about the
creditworthiness of counterparties translating into a correlated withdrawal of
market liquidity, thereby triggering a deterioration in the creditworthiness of
financial institutions that rely on these markets as a source of funding and
generating yet more uncertainty and illiquidity (see Figure 11).340
338. Ittay Eyal & Emin Giin Sirer, A Decentralized Escape Hatch for DAOs, HACKING
DISTRIBUTED (July 11, 2016), http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/07/11/decentralized-escape-hatches-
for-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/5HSK-47DZ].
339. See Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing) Panic of2007, 99 AM.
ECON. REV. 567 (2009); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104
J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012); Gorton & Ordonez, supra note 50; Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action
Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macro-economies, and
Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1 (2015). Not surprisingly, dealers often play a central role in
these collective action problems. See Paul Tucker, "Re-thinking the Lender of Last Resort 29 (BIS
Working Paper No. 79, 2014) ("[W]ishing to avoid the capital strain of allowing their balance sheets to
expand, dealers widen their bid-offer spreads to deter trade or, in the extreme, 'don't pick up the phones'
as used to be said. A collective action problem kicks in, as it is more risky to be a market-maker if you
think your peers are withdrawing.").
340. See Willem Buiter & Anne Sibert, The Central Bank as the Market Maker ofLast
Resort: From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort, VOXEU (Aug. 13, 2007),
https://voxeu.org/article/subprime-crisis-what-central-bankers-should-do-and-why
[https://perma.cc/3NDQ-RBJP].
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Figure 11: The Feedback Effects of Fundamental Uncertainty
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The conventional prophylactic against these types of collective action
problems is the extension of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by central
banks acting in their capacity as "lenders of last resort." 34 1 In technical terms,
ELA involves "the discretionary provision of liquidity to a financial institution
(or the market as a whole) by the central bank in reaction to an adverse shock
which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity which cannot be met
by an alternative source." 342 This liquidity typically takes the form of short-term
loans to banks and other financial institutions experiencing temporary liquidity
problems.34 3 These loans are secured by a pledge of eligible collateral assets,
subject to a discount or "haircut"-designed to protect the central bank against
any decrease in their market value.344 In effect, ELA is designed to pump money
into the financial system, thereby offsetting any contraction in market liquidity
and signaling to bank depositors and other short-term creditors that the central
bank is willing to provide whatever support is necessary in order to restore
341. Deposit insurance is also often viewed as performing a similar role. See Douglas
Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
342. Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, FIN.
STABILITY REV. 151, 152 (Nov. 1999).
343. It can also take the form of central bank purchases of (less liquid) assets in
exchange for (more liquid) cash and cash equivalents that can be used to satisfy the claims of depositors
and other creditors.
344. This discount takes the form of a decrease in the amount of the loan that can be
secured against any given collateral asset. Eligible collateral assets generally include commercial loans,
residential and commercial mortgages, government securities, and investment-grade bonds, asset-backed
securities, and other fixed income instruments.
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market confidence and financial stability. ELA facilities are thus an essential tool
of financial crisis management: the last line of defense against financial panic
and instability before governments are forced to resort to taxpayer-funded
bailouts.
One of the first and most striking policy responses to the global financial
crisis was the dramatic expansion of ELA facilities in the United States, United
Kingdom, and Continental Europe. In the thick of the crisis, the Federal Reserve
established a range of ad hoc facilities designed to provide ELA to a large cross-
section of the financial system: from money market mutual funds, to primary
dealers in government securities, to the triparty repo, asset-backed security,
asset-backed commercial paper, and foreign exchange markets. 345 Similar
facilities were established in other jurisdictions.346 This expansion reflected the
increasingly important role that markets and institutions other than conventional
deposit-taking banks play in the allocation of capital and risk within the financial
system. 347 This, in turn, raises an important question: should central banks
establish standing facilities designed to provide derivatives and other
systemically important markets? Put simply: should they act as dealers of last
resort? 348
The key to understanding the important role that a dealer of last resort
mechanism might play in a crisis resides in the unique character of central banks.
Specifically, the size of central bank balance sheets, the absence of binding
solvency constraints, and the legal authority to create high-powered base money
makes the commitments of these institutions to perform their contractual
obligations extremely credible. In sharp contrast with other market participants,
counterparties are thus highly unlikely to question the creditworthiness of a
central bank even during periods of fundamental uncertainty. This makes
central banks the ideal counterparty to step into the breach created by the
withdrawal of private market liquidity, facilitating the reallocation of risk to the
market participants most willing and able to bear it, ensuring the continuous
availability of market prices, and overcoming potential collective action
345. For a more detailed description of these facilities, see Dietrich Domanski, Richhild
Moessner & William Nelson, Central Banks as Lenders of Last Resort: Experiences During the 2007-
2010 Financial Crisis andLessons for the Future 6-19 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,, Divs. of Research & Statistics
& Monetary Affairs, Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2014-110, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014110pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6K2-
SQ5G]. As Michael Bordo notes, the expansion of ELA facilities in the United States dates at least as far
back as the rescue of Penn Central (and the commercial paper market) in 1970. Michael Bordo, Rules for
a Lender ofLast Resort: A Historical Perspective 24 (2014) (unpublished working paper) (on file with
author).
346. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Bank of England launched its "Special
Liquidity Scheme." See Press Release, Bank of Eng., Special Liquidity Scheme (Apr. 21, 2008),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/news/2008/april/special-liquidity-scheme
[https://perma.cc/DL4E-97X6].
347. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 340.
348. Tucker, supra note 339, at 28.
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problems. Like conventional ELA facilities, dealer of last resort mechanisms
would thus be designed to restore market confidence and reverse the negative
feedback loop generated by fundamental uncertainty.
How might a dealer of last resort work in practice? One relatively
straightforward option would be for the central bank to post continuous two-way
prices-a bid and ask-on various derivative contracts in the same way as other
derivative dealers. The spread between the bid and asking prices would be set to
reflect the central bank's assessment of the underlying market, counterparty
credit, and other risks.349 Importantly, however, this spread would be set outside
the spread that prevailed under normal market conditions. Thus, for example, the
central bank could announce that it was willing to enter into contracts at fifty
basis points outside the average bid and ask over the six-month period
immediately preceding the emergence of market-wide liquidity problems.35 0 If
the average spread over this period was 5.00% (bid) and 5.05% (ask), this would
translate into an effective spread of 4.50% (bid) and 5.55% (ask). Setting the
spread outside that which prevailed under normal market conditions would
maximize the probability that central bank liquidity was only tapped during
periods of severe market turmoil-thus ensuring that it was truly acting as a
dealer of last resort.35 ' It would also provide a powerful incentive for market
participants to return to private markets as soon as possible after a crisis.
Designing an effective dealer of last resort mechanism would require
central banks to address a host of other technical challenges.3 52 Three in
particular stand out. The first challenge would be to determine which derivatives
markets should be eligible for ELA. Important factors in this determination
might include the size of the relevant market, the role of systemically important
financial institutions as dealers or other major counterparties, and whether the
prices within the market are used as inputs in other financial products or
services.3 53 The comparative informational (dis)advantage of central banks in
evaluating risk within a particular market may also be an important
consideration.354 On the basis of these factors, one might argue that there exists
a more compelling policy rationale for extending ELA to interest rate and foreign
349. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 340. As discussed below, this pricing should also
theoretically reflect the fact that, unlike other counterparties, the central bank will not pose any meaningful
counterparty credit risk.
350. The suggested spread and lookback period are only for illustrative purposes:
deeper questions around the optimal design of dealer of last resort mechanisms are beyond the scope of
this Article.
351. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 340.
352. In the United States, the creation of a dealer of last resort mechanism would also
require Congress to grant the Federal Reserve additional statutory authority. See Charles Calomiris et al.,
Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending, 9 J. FIN. ECON. POL'Y 260, 263 (2017).
353. On the incorporation of these prices into other financial products and services, see
Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. 1, 1 (2016).
354. Tucker, supra note 339, at 29. The provision of ELA can thus potentially provide
a signal of private information to the marketplace. Id.
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exchange derivatives, for example, than to equity, credit, or commodity
derivatives. The second challenge would be to determine which institutions
should qualify as eligible counterparties. While dealers are perhaps the most
obvious candidates, it may also make sense to expand eligibility to other major
counterparties depending on, for example, their systemic importance or the
structure of the relevant market. The third challenge is how to avoid the
inevitable moral hazard and stigma problems generated by the extension of ELA.
In theory, the moral hazard problems could be ameliorated by subjecting eligible
counterparties to enhanced prudential regulation and supervision.355 To avoid
stigma problems, meanwhile, it may be necessary to build a temporal lag into
any requirements for central banks to disclose the identity of counterparties that
have benefited from ELA.356 Ultimately, these more detailed questions about the
optimal design of dealer of last resort mechanisms are beyond the scope of this
Article. The key insight is simply that where a central bank can effectively
address these challenges-these mechanisms can represent a valuable weapon in
their crisis management arsenal.
One might object to the creation of a dealer of last resort mechanism on a
number of different grounds. Free market ideologues, for example, might object
on the grounds that these mechanisms represent an unwarranted incursion by a
public body into private markets. Yet this objection ignores the historical fact
that no financial system of any meaningful size or complexity has survived for
any length of time without a significant level of state support. 357 Given this fact,
we are arguably better off designing these mechanisms in advance rather than
under the crushing political, economic, and temporal pressures of an incipient
crisis. A second, more nuanced, objection is that dealer of last resort mechanisms
expose central banks to potentially significant market, counterparty, and
reputational risks. This is undoubtedly true. Yet as observed by Willem Buiter
and Anne Sibert: "without taking these risks . .. central banks will be financially
and reputationally safe, but poor servants of the public interest." 358
Conclusion
Almost four decades after first bursting onto the scene, derivatives are
perhaps no longer at the cutting edge of financial innovation. Nevertheless,
academic and public policy debates around derivatives continue to be plagued
by misunderstandings about the legal and economic structure of derivative
355. Calomiris et al., supra note 352, at 263.
356. Although these lags notably did not prevent stigma problems from arising in
connection with the extension of ELA during the financial crisis.
357. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Erik Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
333 (2016) (describing the role of the state in engineering "safe" assets); Robert Hockett & Saule
Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) (describing finance as a public-
private franchise arrangement); Katharina Pistor, The Legal Theory ofFinance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315
(2013) (describing the essentially hybridity of finance).
358. Buiter and Sibert, supra note 340.
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contracts and the important differences between these contracts and conventional
equity and debt securities. This Article has sought to correct these
misunderstanding by splitting derivative contracts open and examining the
complex bundle of different elements that reside within them. These elements
include state-contingent contracts, property and decision-making rights, and
relational mechanisms. These elements work together to strengthen the
credibility of the commitments underpinning derivative contracts. Some of these
elements are designed to work under normal market conditions, others under
conditions of fundamental uncertainty. All of these elements have limits.
Understanding derivatives as complex and heterogeneous bundles of
different elements yields a number of important policy insights. The most
important of these insights are that the regulatory treatment of derivatives as
securities may distract attention from their significant prudential risks, that the
drive toward central clearing and greater automation needs to accompanied by
mechanisms designed to reduce the risks stemming from contractual
incompleteness and rigidity, and that there may be an important role for central
banks in providing liquidity to derivative markets during periods of fundamental
uncertainty and financial instability. Having broken derivatives down into their
constituent elements, we must now seek to reconstruct them on more solid
foundations.
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Appendix
"Good" Times "Bad" Times
Market liquidity is sufficient Market liquidity is not
to enable new information sufficient to enable new
about the underlying or information about the
posted collateral to be underlying or posted
incorporated into current collateral to be incorporated
market prices into current market prices
(informationally efficient (informationally inefficient
markets). * markets). *
Prices within derivative and Prices within derivative and
other credit markets reflect other credit markets do not
differences in credit risk reflect differences in credit
(separating equilibrium).** risk (pooling equilibrium).**
Current market prices for the Current market prices for the
underlying or posted underlying or posted
collateral, even when falling, collateral are not readily
are readily observable and observable or verifiable.
verifiable.
*Informational efficiency is of course a relative concept. See Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 63. Accordingly, the key variable in terms of understanding the shift
from "good" times to "bad" times is whether there has been a pronounced
decrease in informational efficiency.
**Notably, pooling equilibriums that result in the systemic underestimation of
(differences in) credit risk are included in "bad times" for these purposes. This is
consistent with the observation that periods characterized by these types of
equilibriums often proceed periods where markets systemically overestimate
(differences in) credit risk-i.e., a panic. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 339.
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